What was the Hurd v. Hodge Case of 1948 about?
451892
In 1906, twenty of thirty-one lots in the 100 block of Bryant Street, Northwest, in the City of Washington, were sold subject to the following covenant: '* * * that said lot shall never be rented, leased, sold, transferred or conveyed unto any Negro or colored person, under a penalty of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000), which shall be a lien against said property.' The covenant imposes no time limitation on the restriction.\n\nPrior to the sales which gave rise to these cases, the twenty lots which are subject to the covenants were at all times owned and occupied by white persons, except for a brief period when three of the houses were occupied by Negroes who were eventually induced to move without [334 U.S. 24 , 27]   legal action. The remaining eleven lots in the same block,1 however, are not subject to a restrictive agreement and, as found by the District Court, were occupied by Negroes for the twenty years prior to the institution of this litigation.\n\nThese cases involve seven of the twenty lots which are subject to the terms of the restrictive covenants. In No. 290, petitioners Hurd, found by the trial court to be Negroes,2 purchased one of the restricted properties from the white owners. In No. 291, petitioner Urciolo, a white real estate dealer, sold and conveyed three of the restricted properties to the Negro petitioners Rowe, Savage, and Stewart. Petitioner Urciolo also owns three other lots in the block subject to the covenants. In both cases, the Negro petitioners are presently occupying as homes the respective properties which have been conveyed to them.\n\nSuits were instituted in the District Court by respondents, who own other property in the block subject to the terms of the covenants, praying for injunctive relief to enforce the terms of the restrictive agreement. The cases were consolidated for trial, and after a hearing, the court entered a judgment declaring null and void the deeds of the Negro petitioners; enjoining petitioner Urciolo and one Ryan, the white property owners who had sold the houses to the Negro petitioners, from leasing, selling or conveying the properties to any Negro or colored person; enjoining the Negro petitioners from leasing or conveying the properties and directing those petitioners 'to remove themselves and all of their personal belongings' from the premises within sixty days. [334 U.S. 24 , 28]   The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 3 The majority of the court was of the opinion that the action of the District Court was consistent with earlier decisions of the Court of Appeals and that those decisions should be held determinative in these cases.\n\nPetitioners have attacked the judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenants in these case on a wide variety of grounds. Primary reliance, however, is placed on the contention that such governmental action on the part of the courts of the District of Columbia is forbidden by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 4  \n\nWhether judicial enforcement of racial restrictive agreements by the federal courts of the District of Columbia violates the Fifth Amendment has never been adjudicated by this Court. In Corrigan v. Buckley, 1926, 271 U.S. 323 , an appeal was taken to this Court from a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which had affirmed an order of the lower court granting enforcement to a restrictive covenant. But as was pointed out in our opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, the only constitutional issue which had been raised in the lower courts in the Corrigan case, and consequently, the only constitutional question before this Court on appeal, related to the validity of the private agreements as such. Nothing in the opinion [334 U.S. 24 , 29]   of this Court in that case, therefore, may properly be regarded as an adjudication of the issue
88413
Absolute liability?  Resevoir breaking?\n\nYour turn.  Palsgraff v. Long Island RR.
140022
You can go to free site, FindLaw, or just try to Google "United States v. Rosado-Fernandez" and see what you get. If you have Westlaw or Lexis you can use those
417983
That trial was ultimately heard before the Supreme Court. Their opinion is at the site below. The ruling goes over the District ruling in detail.\n\nEdit:\nDon't pay for that crap in the site above. It's just a poorly written essay about the cases, not the opinion itself, which is available freely below.
112712
Probable Cause: Referencing the 1st link below (comes from Smith v. U.S. 1949 establishing the experienced police officer standard)\nThe 2nd link details the Fourth Amendment, which is where your rights against unlawful searches and seizures of your person/property/etc are explained.\n\nMR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe case was Brinegar v. United States, where Mr. Brinegar was arrested for liquor running in Oklahoma. The link below details the case, including the subsequent appeals and relation to another case, Carroll v. United States. Both of which revolve around search and seizure rules as relating to  vehicles.
212824
Not sure what your question means, but...\n\nGenerally there is no punishment for individual officers conducting an illegal search.  However, under the 4th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution, any evidence arising from an illegal search cannot be used in court against the individual whose rights were violated (i.e. the person whose property was searched).  It is a fundamental principle in criminal law called the Exclusionary Rule.  It indirectly punishes and deters unreasonable searches.
91469
It was actually a 1998 case U.S. Supreme Court case.  The case involved a wrongful death lawsuit arising from a high speed police chase.  The issue in this case is whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender. The Supreme Court said no and ruled in favor of the officers.
1077591
In Arizona back in the 1960's a man was arrested named "Miranda."  He was "encouraged" to confess to his crimes and later the US Supreme Court passed down the "Miranda" ruling which required police officers to inform arrested individuals of their rights;\n\nThe right to remain silent,\nThe fact that anything they say or do can be used against them,\nThe right to an attorney,\nAnd the right to an attorney if they can't afford one\n\nSadly the punishment for failure of law enforcement to engage in this practice is that guilty people are returned to society unpunished....
264853
1.. What state did this incident occur in? 2..The revised statute codes have 3 letters and not 2. 3..Why did you ask the same question four times? 4..How old are you? 5..Why would you enter a plea unless you had been charged and know that the charges had not expired? 6..Anyone know why attorneys have so much college behind them?
168235
U.S. Supreme Court\nHAMMER v. DAGENHART\n 247 U.S. 251 (1918)\nDecided June 3, 1918.\n\nMr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court. \nA bill was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina by a father in his own behalf and as next friend of his two minor sons, one under the age of fourteen years and the other between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years, employes in a cotton mill at Charlotte, North Carolina, to enjoin the enforcement of the act of Congress intended to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child labor. Act Sept. 1, 1916, 39 Stat. 675.... \nThe attack upon the act rests upon three propositions: First: It is not a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; second: It contravenes the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution; third: It conflicts with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. \nThe controlling question for decision is: Is it within the authority of Congress in regulating commerce among the states to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of manufactured goods, the product of a factory in which, within thirty days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the age of fourteen have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 o'clock p. m., or before the hour of 6 o'clock a. m.? \nThe power essential to the passage of this act, the government contends, is found in the commerce clause of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states. \nIn Gibbons v. Ogdon, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for this court, and defining the extent and nature of the commerce power, said, 'It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.' In other words, the power is one to control the means by which commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroying it as to particular commodities. But it is insisted that adjudged cases in this court establish the doctrine that the power to regulate given to Congress incidentally includes the authority to prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities and therefore that the subject is not open for discussion. The cases demonstrate the contrary. They rest upon the character of the particular subjects dealt with and the fact that the scope of governmental authority, state or national, possessed over them is such that the authority to prohibit is as to them but the exertion of the power to regulate.... \nIn each of these instances the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results. In other words, although the power over interstate transportation was to regulate, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to effect the evil intended. \nThis element is wanting in the present case. The thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those manufacturers in the states who employ children within the prohibited ages. The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the states, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the states. The goods shipped are of themselves harmless. The act permits them to be freely shipped after thirty days from the time of their removal from the factory. When offered for shipment, and before transportation begins, the labor of their production is over, and the mere fact that they were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their production subject to federal control under the commerce power. \nCommerce 'consists of intercourse and traffic ... and includes the transportation
646940
Similarities:\nBoth cases were based on the 14th Amendment (due process, equal protection)\nBoth cases were about segregation (Plessy was about segregation on railway cars, Brown was about segregation in schools)\n\nDifferences:\nIn Plessy, the S.Ct. found that the 14th Amendment didn't prohibit states from enacting laws that segregated the races because segregation didn't mean that one race was inferior to the other.  This is known as the "seperate but equal" doctrine.\nIn Brown, the S.Ct. found that segregating schools on the basis of race violated the 14th Amendment because it denied black children equal protection of the laws.  \n\nIn many ways Plessy signalled the beginning of legal segregation laws ("Jim Crow" laws), and Brown signalled the end of legal segregation laws.
143529
go to the courthouse.  It should cost anything to get the basic info.  Also do an internet search of the case and check old newspapers.
728371
I found a pice on the internet (read below). Why don't you write about this courtcase, which, in effect, stopped public rasism in America?\n\n"After ten years the court and the schools.\nThe 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka ruling made it clear that segregation would not be tolerated and that states must comply with federal law. In this program, filmed ten years after Brown, news correspondents report on the mixed progress made toward integrating public schools in Nashville, New Rochelle, New Orleans and Prince Edward County, Virginia. Stumbling blocks such as faculty segregation, busing and segregational zoning are examined. A discussion featuring Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Georgia Governor Carl Sanders and Ex-Secretary of the NAACP, Roy Wilkins concludes the program.\nJohnson Center - Videotapes"
326885
The Wikipedia entry gives a good little background summary, something like this: \n\nIn late 1828, the state of Georgia was afraid the federal government would not be able to follow through on their promise to remove the Cherokee Nation from Georgia. So the state started taking steps to strip the Cherokee Nation of their rights, in the hopes of forcing them out. In the usual manner of things (lawsuits, lobbying, etc.), the case wound up in the Supreme Court.\n\nA Cherokee delegation selected William Wirt as their defense, and asked for -- and here I'm going to quote Wiki directly as it's hard to paraphrase ...\n\n"an injunction, claiming that Georgia's state legislature had created laws which, "go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society". Wirt argued that "the Cherokee Nation [was] a foreign nation in the sense of our constitution and law..." and was not subject to Georgia's jurisdiction. Wirt asked the Supreme Court to null and void all Georgia laws extended over Cherokee territory on the grounds that they violated the U.S. Constitution, United States-Cherokee treaties, and United States intercourse laws.\n\nThe injunction was denied, on the grounds that the Cherokee people, not being a state, and claiming to be independent of the United States, were a domestic dependent nation, over which the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction. Although the Court determined that it did not have original jurisdication in this case, the Court held open the possibility that it yet might rule in favor of the Cherokee."\n\nThe other site I've linked to looks like the official ruling on the case. (With all its lovely legalese)
242758
Hmm... - the Civil Rights Act 1968 (Open House Act)- outlaws discrimination in housing.\n\n\nI don't see specific references to the Supreme Court though.
220079
Do you understand what you are asking?  There are thousands of such cases.  Are you interested in certain eras.  Maybe cases under the various Chief Justices.  How about certain types of cases?  Would like to compare similar case subjects prior to 1868 as opposed to post 1868?  However, you can start by going to the source link:
222658
The case is actually A03-1898 in the Minnesota Supreme Court, not the 8th circuit (which is a federal court). The full opinion is at the site below. In it, they argue that whether or not a defendant is a repeat offender for the purposes of enhancing a sentence is a finding of fact, and thus must be determined by a jury, not a judge.