What is murray v. curlett?
88284
While the famous 1963 Supreme Court decision Murray v. Curlett helped to end, at least in theory, the unconstitutional practice of mandatory prayer recitation in public schools, it also gave rise to profound distortions of American history by school prayer advocates. One example of this is the notion that "Before that Atheist Madalyn Murray threw God out of the classroom", prayer in school was a well-established American institution which established a religious and moral tone throughout the culture. \n\nPrior to the American Revolution, various religious bodies enjoyed a unique position of power. Madalyn O'Hair noted in her book "Freedom Under Siege" that "Reading Colonial history immediately prior to the Revolution, specifically the theological clashes between the states, one finds that the Founding Fathers had become completely disenchanted with each colony's insistence upon a particular sect established and supported financially by tax funds and the body politic." \n\nThese "established" churches had enormous power. One had to support the church through taxes, and often had to be a member in order to exercise various rights and privileges, such as even owning property. It was no surprise, then, that "come the Revolution", a process of "disestablishment" began. The churches were taken off the social welfare rolls and were no longer "established" as the official religious body of a region. Naturally, minority religious groups supported the idea; but many churches opposed the disestablishment process, seeing the demise of their privileged status in the new Republic. \n\nVirginia led the way with its Declaration of Rights, which was enacted in June of 1776. Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey soon followed, and in 1777, New York, North Carolina and Georgia disestablished their respective churches. Massachusetts waited until 1833. \n\nAfter the wave of disestablishment of the official state churches, many states -- the original thirteen and the new territories which joined the United States -- took an ambiguous view of official religion. Most states, for instance, did not mandate religious exercise in public schools. In fact, by the 1960's, only five states actually had laws which required Bible recitation in their public schools. \n\nSeven other states permitted Bible reading, but allowed for students who did not wish to participate to be excused. Even that practice, of course, violated the rights of non-participating students (both religious and non-believer), and courts in 11 states ruled this prayer formula to be unconstitutional. These legal decisions cover the period of 1890-1910. \n\nThe period of 1910 to 1930 witnessed vigorous attempts to reverse this trend, however, and institute school prayer. Groups such as the National Reform Association succeeded in having laws passed in 17 states which made some provision for prayer and Bible recitation in schools. The rationale was that this religious exercise would "benefit" society. Sometimes, prayer ritual was linked to other invasive movements, including the Prohibitionist craze and other bizarre social experiments. Even so, practices varied considerably from state to state. In some jurisdictions, the option of whether or not to institute prayer was left to local school systems. \n\nContrary to the assertion of school prayer supporters, the practice has only limited precedent throughout the more than two centuries our Republic has existed. It was never universal -- just as there has never been a time when the majority of the American population consisted of regular church-goers. Even where school prayer did exist, it turned out to be a source of social conflict and divisiveness, often with various religious sects arguing with each other over whose prayer should be recited, or whose Bible should be used for the regular devotions. \n\nThe Murray v. Curlett case was actually the first
253719
http://www.lacitybeat.com/article.php?id=1919&IssueNum=97\n\nThe author of that article and the attornies mentioned in the story...the ruling on that suit is pending, but the Federal Judge is leaning towards the Plaintiff (that's the inmates, in this case)
450813
Furman V. Georgia was a Supreme Court case in 1972. The ruling was requiring some consistency when giving out death penalty decisions. I'm not exactly sure what you're looking for but go to the website below, it has a lot of good information for any report you may need it for.\nHope it helps!
168235
U.S. Supreme Court\nHAMMER v. DAGENHART\n 247 U.S. 251 (1918)\nDecided June 3, 1918.\n\nMr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court. \nA bill was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina by a father in his own behalf and as next friend of his two minor sons, one under the age of fourteen years and the other between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years, employes in a cotton mill at Charlotte, North Carolina, to enjoin the enforcement of the act of Congress intended to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child labor. Act Sept. 1, 1916, 39 Stat. 675.... \nThe attack upon the act rests upon three propositions: First: It is not a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; second: It contravenes the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution; third: It conflicts with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. \nThe controlling question for decision is: Is it within the authority of Congress in regulating commerce among the states to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of manufactured goods, the product of a factory in which, within thirty days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the age of fourteen have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 o'clock p. m., or before the hour of 6 o'clock a. m.? \nThe power essential to the passage of this act, the government contends, is found in the commerce clause of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states. \nIn Gibbons v. Ogdon, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for this court, and defining the extent and nature of the commerce power, said, 'It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.' In other words, the power is one to control the means by which commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroying it as to particular commodities. But it is insisted that adjudged cases in this court establish the doctrine that the power to regulate given to Congress incidentally includes the authority to prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities and therefore that the subject is not open for discussion. The cases demonstrate the contrary. They rest upon the character of the particular subjects dealt with and the fact that the scope of governmental authority, state or national, possessed over them is such that the authority to prohibit is as to them but the exertion of the power to regulate.... \nIn each of these instances the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results. In other words, although the power over interstate transportation was to regulate, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to effect the evil intended. \nThis element is wanting in the present case. The thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those manufacturers in the states who employ children within the prohibited ages. The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the states, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the states. The goods shipped are of themselves harmless. The act permits them to be freely shipped after thirty days from the time of their removal from the factory. When offered for shipment, and before transportation begins, the labor of their production is over, and the mere fact that they were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their production subject to federal control under the commerce power. \nCommerce 'consists of intercourse and traffic ... and includes the transportation
62801
If the fraud is against the government you can use what is called the Qui-Tam statute.  This is a law originally begun by Abraham Lincoln during the civil war to reward people who reported fraud in the war effort.  It has been used in a variety of situations such as defense contractor fraud and healthcare fraud.  The person who brings it to light is called the relator, who with the help of an attorney files a lawsuit that is not public information (under seal).  The government reviews the case and determines if it has merit.  If they agree, they intervene and the case proceeds.  At the end of the case the relator receives a portion of whatever the government recovers.
30333
The facts are set forth within the body of the Supreme Court's opinion here:\nhttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=403&invol=528
579255
check out this court case http://www.ulcseminary.org/forum/uploads/ULCvUSA.pdf
181182
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling:\n\n"In 1973, petitioners in No. 85-1626 (hereinafter petitioners), including individual employees of Lukens Steel Co. (Lukens), brought suit in Federal District Court against Lukens and the employees' collective-bargaining agents (Unions), asserting racial discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The court held that Pennsylvania's 6-year statute of limitations governing contract claims applied to 1981 claims, that Lukens had discriminated in certain respects, and that the Unions were also guilty of discriminatory practices in failing to challenge Lukens' discriminatory discharges of probationary employees, in failing and refusing to assert instances of racial discrimination as grievances, and in tolerating and tacitly encouraging racial harassment. The court entered injunctive orders against Lukens and the Unions, reserving damages issues for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania's 2-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions, rather than the 6-year statute, controlled the 1981 claims, but affirmed the liability judgment against the Unions."
475937
There is an excellent resource regarding both.  But I agree with the idea that since ID isn't scientific, (As ruled by Judges Jones in the Kilmitzer vs Dover trial 2004), then it should be a tad bit one sided.\n\nCheck out the sources listed below for in-depth info.
164680
The pettiest things ever appealed all the way to the United States Supreme Court were two $10.00 traffic tickets.  State law provided they were unappealable so the first court of recourse was actually the SCt.  \n\nWell, I think it's neat.
763051
Go to www.lawresearch.com
281373
try this\nhttp://library.findlaw.com/
658922
Here is a copy of the ruling by the Supreme Court:\nhttp://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-1036.ZS.html\n\nhttp://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/765/\n\nIf you would like to hear the oral argument before the court, it is located here:\nhttp://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/765/resources
48823
First of all, the ACLU would have nothing to do with this case. They generally only take cases involving the government infringing on people's civil liberties.\n\nSecond of all, where's your source for this case? You have a few specific details, so surely you must have some news story or a link of some kind to more information? I have a hard time believing your statement.\n\nThird of all, the answer to your question is "no."
222658
The case is actually A03-1898 in the Minnesota Supreme Court, not the 8th circuit (which is a federal court). The full opinion is at the site below. In it, they argue that whether or not a defendant is a repeat offender for the purposes of enhancing a sentence is a finding of fact, and thus must be determined by a jury, not a judge.
247388
Very basically:\n\nPlessy v. Ferguson held that "separate but equal" was OK - separate train cars with similar (equal) amenities for white people and black people was OK.\n\nBrown v. Board of Education implicitly overruled this, holding that separate but equal was inherently unequal.  It also ordered that school boards begin taking action to integrate schools.
78116
This question's been bugging me since last night 'cuz it sounded so familiar. Problem was, you got not one, but both names wrong. And the topic is not entirely an issue of residency, but Article IV, the interstate privilege and immunities clause. \n\nThe case name is Hicklin v. Orbeck 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (The Alaska hire case). Here's a cite to the case:\nhttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=437&invol=518\n\nHere's a quick synopsis from my outlines (from way back when): Alaska requires the Alaskan residents be given an absolute preference over non-residents for all jobs on the Alaska pipeline. It was held that Alaska's decisions to prefer its own citizens over out of state citizens impairs the out of state citizens' rights under the interstate Privileges and Immunities clause and is invalid. \n\nThe P/I clause prevents a state from discriminating against non-residents regarding rights that are fundamental. The rights that are considered fundamental are related mostly to commerce (right to be employed, practicing your profession,, the right to engage in business, etc). \n\nYou'll have to read the case for all the juicy bits; what I've written comes from notes from years ago.