Daily Papers

Assessing how well a large language model (LLM) understands human, rather than merely text, remains an open challenge. To bridge the gap, we introduce Sentient Agent as a Judge (SAGE), an automated evaluation framework that measures an LLM's higher-order social cognition. SAGE instantiates a Sentient Agent that simulates human-like emotional changes and inner thoughts during interaction, providing a more realistic evaluation of the tested model in multi-turn conversations. At every turn, the agent reasons about (i) how its emotion changes, (ii) how it feels, and (iii) how it should reply, yielding a numerical emotion trajectory and interpretable inner thoughts. Experiments on 100 supportive-dialogue scenarios show that the final Sentient emotion score correlates strongly with Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory (BLRI) ratings and utterance-level empathy metrics, validating psychological fidelity. We also build a public Sentient Leaderboard covering 18 commercial and open-source models that uncovers substantial gaps (up to 4x) between frontier systems (GPT-4o-Latest, Gemini2.5-Pro) and earlier baselines, gaps not reflected in conventional leaderboards (e.g., Arena). SAGE thus provides a principled, scalable and interpretable tool for tracking progress toward genuinely empathetic and socially adept language agents.

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested multi-agent reasoning. Nonetheless, the computational complexity escalates exponentially with each level of reasoning, posing a significant challenge. However, humans effortlessly perform complex social inferences as part of their daily lives. To bridge the gap between human-like inference capabilities and computational limitations, we propose a novel approach: leveraging neural networks to amortize high-order social inference, thereby expediting nested multi-agent reasoning. We evaluate our method in two challenging multi-agent interaction domains. The experimental results demonstrate that our method is computationally efficient while exhibiting minimal degradation in accuracy.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

Social interactions form the foundation of human societies. Artificial intelligence has made significant progress in certain areas, but enabling machines to seamlessly understand social interactions remains an open challenge. It is important to address this gap by endowing machines with social capabilities. We identify three key capabilities needed for effective social understanding: 1) understanding multimodal social cues, 2) understanding multi-party dynamics, and 3) understanding beliefs. Building upon these foundations, we classify and review existing machine learning works on social understanding from the perspectives of verbal, non-verbal, and multimodal social cues. The verbal branch focuses on understanding linguistic signals such as speaker intent, dialogue sentiment, and commonsense reasoning. The non-verbal branch addresses techniques for perceiving social meaning from visual behaviors such as body gestures, gaze patterns, and facial expressions. The multimodal branch covers approaches that integrate verbal and non-verbal multimodal cues to holistically interpret social interactions such as recognizing emotions, conversational dynamics, and social situations. By reviewing the scope and limitations of current approaches and benchmarks, we aim to clarify the development trajectory and illuminate the path towards more comprehensive intelligence for social understanding. We hope this survey will spur further research interest and insights into this area.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Networks provide a powerful formalism for modeling complex systems by using a model of pairwise interactions. But much of the structure within these systems involves interactions that take place among more than two nodes at once; for example, communication within a group rather than person-to person, collaboration among a team rather than a pair of coauthors, or biological interaction between a set of molecules rather than just two. Such higher-order interactions are ubiquitous, but their empirical study has received limited attention, and little is known about possible organizational principles of such structures. Here we study the temporal evolution of 19 datasets with explicit accounting for higher-order interactions. We show that there is a rich variety of structure in our datasets but datasets from the same system types have consistent patterns of higher-order structure. Furthermore, we find that tie strength and edge density are competing positive indicators of higher-order organization, and these trends are consistent across interactions involving differing numbers of nodes. To systematically further the study of theories for such higher-order structures, we propose higher-order link prediction as a benchmark problem to assess models and algorithms that predict higher-order structure. We find a fundamental differences from traditional pairwise link prediction, with a greater role for local rather than long-range information in predicting the appearance of new interactions.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

To increase social bonding with interlocutors, humans naturally acquire the ability to respond appropriately in a given situation by considering which conversational skill is most suitable for the response - a process we call skill-of-mind. For large language model (LLM)-based conversational agents, planning appropriate conversational skills, as humans do, is challenging due to the complexity of social dialogue, especially in interactive scenarios. To address this, we propose a skill-of-mind-annotated conversation dataset, named Multifaceted Skill-of-Mind, which includes multi-turn and multifaceted conversational skills across various interactive scenarios (e.g., long-term, counseling, task-oriented), grounded in diverse social contexts (e.g., demographics, persona, rules of thumb). This dataset consists of roughly 100K conversations. Using this dataset, we introduce a new family of skill-of-mind-infused LLMs, named Thanos, with model sizes of 1B, 3B, and 8B parameters. With extensive experiments, these models successfully demonstrate the skill-of-mind process and exhibit strong generalizability in inferring multifaceted skills across a variety of domains. Moreover, we show that Thanos significantly enhances the quality of responses generated by LLM-based conversational agents and promotes prosocial behavior in human evaluations.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in human-AI interactions, their social reasoning capabilities in interpersonal contexts are critical. We introduce SCRIPTS, a 1k-dialogue dataset in English and Korean, sourced from movie scripts. The task involves evaluating models' social reasoning capability to infer the interpersonal relationships (e.g., friends, sisters, lovers) between speakers in each dialogue. Each dialogue is annotated with probabilistic relational labels (Highly Likely, Less Likely, Unlikely) by native (or equivalent) Korean and English speakers from Korea and the U.S. Evaluating nine models on our task, current proprietary LLMs achieve around 75-80% on the English dataset, whereas their performance on Korean drops to 58-69%. More strikingly, models select Unlikely relationships in 10-25% of their responses. Furthermore, we find that thinking models and chain-of-thought prompting, effective for general reasoning, provide minimal benefits for social reasoning and occasionally amplify social biases. Our findings reveal significant limitations in current LLMs' social reasoning capabilities, highlighting the need for efforts to develop socially-aware language models.

Language models have made significant progress in generating coherent text and predicting next tokens based on input prompts. This study compares the next-token prediction performance of two well-known models: OpenAI's GPT-2 and Meta's Llama-2-7b-chat-hf on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. To evaluate their capabilities, we built a dataset from 10 short stories sourced from the Explore ToM Dataset. We enhanced these stories by programmatically inserting additional sentences (infills) using GPT-4, creating variations that introduce different levels of contextual complexity. This setup enables analysis of how increasing context affects model performance. We tested both models under four temperature settings (0.01, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0) and evaluated their ability to predict the next token across three reasoning levels. Zero-order reasoning involves tracking the state, either current (ground truth) or past (memory). First-order reasoning concerns understanding another's mental state (e.g., "Does Anne know the apple is salted?"). Second-order reasoning adds recursion (e.g., "Does Anne think that Charles knows the apple is salted?"). Our results show that adding more infill sentences slightly reduces prediction accuracy, as added context increases complexity and ambiguity. Llama-2 consistently outperforms GPT-2 in prediction accuracy, especially at lower temperatures, demonstrating greater confidence in selecting the most probable token. As reasoning complexity rises, model responses diverge more. Notably, GPT-2 and Llama-2 display greater variability in predictions during first- and second-order reasoning tasks. These findings illustrate how model architecture, temperature, and contextual complexity influence next-token prediction, contributing to a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of current language models.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

As Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems are increasingly employed in intricate social environments, a pressing query emerges: Can these NLP systems mirror human-esque collaborative intelligence, in a multi-agent society consisting of multiple large language models (LLMs)? This paper probes the collaboration mechanisms among contemporary NLP systems by melding practical experiments with theoretical insights. We fabricate four unique `societies' comprised of LLM agents, where each agent is characterized by a specific `trait' (easy-going or overconfident) and engages in collaboration with a distinct `thinking pattern' (debate or reflection). Evaluating these multi-agent societies on three benchmark datasets, we discern that LLM agents navigate tasks by leveraging diverse social behaviors, from active debates to introspective reflections. Notably, certain collaborative strategies only optimize efficiency (using fewer API tokens), but also outshine previous top-tier approaches. Moreover, our results further illustrate that LLM agents manifest human-like social behaviors, such as conformity or majority rule, mirroring foundational Social Psychology theories. In conclusion, we integrate insights from Social Psychology to contextualize the collaboration of LLM agents, inspiring further investigations into the collaboration mechanism for LLMs. We commit to sharing our code and datasets (already submitted in supplementary materials), hoping to catalyze further research in this promising avenue (All code and data are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/MachineSoM.).

Social norms -- the unspoken commonsense rules about acceptable social behavior -- are crucial in understanding the underlying causes and intents of people's actions in narratives. For example, underlying an action such as "wanting to call cops on my neighbors" are social norms that inform our conduct, such as "It is expected that you report crimes." We present Social Chemistry, a new conceptual formalism to study people's everyday social norms and moral judgments over a rich spectrum of real life situations described in natural language. We introduce Social-Chem-101, a large-scale corpus that catalogs 292k rules-of-thumb such as "it is rude to run a blender at 5am" as the basic conceptual units. Each rule-of-thumb is further broken down with 12 different dimensions of people's judgments, including social judgments of good and bad, moral foundations, expected cultural pressure, and assumed legality, which together amount to over 4.5 million annotations of categorical labels and free-text descriptions. Comprehensive empirical results based on state-of-the-art neural models demonstrate that computational modeling of social norms is a promising research direction. Our model framework, Neural Norm Transformer, learns and generalizes Social-Chem-101 to successfully reason about previously unseen situations, generating relevant (and potentially novel) attribute-aware social rules-of-thumb.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

LLMs exhibit promising Social Intelligence (SI) in modeling human behavior, raising the need to evaluate LLMs' SI and their discrepancy with humans. SI equips humans with interpersonal abilities to behave wisely in navigating social interactions to achieve social goals. This presents an operational evaluation paradigm: outcome-oriented goal achievement evaluation and process-oriented interpersonal ability evaluation, which existing work fails to address. To this end, we propose SocialEval, a script-based bilingual SI benchmark, integrating outcome- and process-oriented evaluation by manually crafting narrative scripts. Each script is structured as a world tree that contains plot lines driven by interpersonal ability, providing a comprehensive view of how LLMs navigate social interactions. Experiments show that LLMs fall behind humans on both SI evaluations, exhibit prosociality, and prefer more positive social behaviors, even if they lead to goal failure. Analysis of LLMs' formed representation space and neuronal activations reveals that LLMs have developed ability-specific functional partitions akin to the human brain.

Humans continuously infer the states, goals, and behaviors of others by perceiving their surroundings in dynamic, real-world social interactions. However, most Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks only evaluate static, text-based scenarios, which have a significant gap compared to real interactions. We propose the SoMi-ToM benchmark, designed to evaluate multi-perspective ToM in embodied multi-agent complex social interactions. This benchmark is based on rich multimodal interaction data generated by the interaction environment SoMi, covering diverse crafting goals and social relationships. Our framework supports multi-level evaluation: (1) first-person evaluation provides multimodal (visual, dialogue, action, etc.) input from a first-person perspective during a task for real-time state inference, (2) third-person evaluation provides complete third-person perspective video and text records after a task for goal and behavior inference. This evaluation method allows for a more comprehensive examination of a model's ToM capabilities from both the subjective immediate experience and the objective global observation. We constructed a challenging dataset containing 35 third-person perspective videos, 363 first-person perspective images, and 1225 expert-annotated multiple-choice questions (three options). On this dataset, we systematically evaluated the performance of human subjects and several state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). The results show that LVLMs perform significantly worse than humans on SoMi-ToM: the average accuracy gap between humans and models is 40.1% in first-person evaluation and 26.4% in third-person evaluation. This indicates that future LVLMs need to further improve their ToM capabilities in embodied, complex social interactions.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Higher-order interactions (HOIs) are ubiquitous in real-world complex systems and applications. Investigation of deep learning for HOIs, thus, has become a valuable agenda for the data mining and machine learning communities. As networks of HOIs are expressed mathematically as hypergraphs, hypergraph neural networks (HNNs) have emerged as a powerful tool for representation learning on hypergraphs. Given the emerging trend, we present the first survey dedicated to HNNs, with an in-depth and step-by-step guide. Broadly, the present survey overviews HNN architectures, training strategies, and applications. First, we break existing HNNs down into four design components: (i) input features, (ii) input structures, (iii) message-passing schemes, and (iv) training strategies. Second, we examine how HNNs address and learn HOIs with each of their components. Third, we overview the recent applications of HNNs in recommendation, bioinformatics and medical science, time series analysis, and computer vision. Lastly, we conclude with a discussion on limitations and future directions.

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' perceptions and mental states, is fundamental to human interaction but remains a challenging task for Large Language Models (LLMs). While existing ToM reasoning methods show promise with reasoning via perceptual perspective-taking, they often rely excessively on LLMs, reducing their efficiency and limiting their applicability to high-order ToM reasoning, which requires multi-hop reasoning about characters' beliefs. To address these issues, we present EnigmaToM, a novel neuro-symbolic framework that enhances ToM reasoning by integrating a Neural Knowledge Base of entity states (Enigma) for (1) a psychology-inspired iterative masking mechanism that facilitates accurate perspective-taking and (2) knowledge injection that elicits key entity information. Enigma generates structured representations of entity states, which construct spatial scene graphs -- leveraging spatial information as an inductive bias -- for belief tracking of various ToM orders and enhancing events with fine-grained entity state details. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks, including ToMi, HiToM, and FANToM, show that EnigmaToM significantly improves ToM reasoning across LLMs of varying sizes, particularly excelling in high-order reasoning scenarios.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in social deduction games (SDGs) like Werewolf, where strategic reasoning and social deception are essential. However, current approaches remain limited to textual information, ignoring crucial multimodal cues such as facial expressions and tone of voice that humans naturally use to communicate. Moreover, existing SDG agents primarily focus on inferring other players' identities without modeling how others perceive themselves or fellow players. To address these limitations, we use One Night Ultimate Werewolf (ONUW) as a testbed and present MultiMind, the first framework integrating multimodal information into SDG agents. MultiMind processes facial expressions and vocal tones alongside verbal content, while employing a Theory of Mind (ToM) model to represent each player's suspicion levels toward others. By combining this ToM model with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), our agent identifies communication strategies that minimize suspicion directed at itself. Through comprehensive evaluation in both agent-versus-agent simulations and studies with human players, we demonstrate MultiMind's superior performance in gameplay. Our work presents a significant advancement toward LLM agents capable of human-like social reasoning across multimodal domains.

Understanding human social behavior such as recognizing emotions and the social dynamics causing them is an important and challenging problem. While LLMs have made remarkable advances, they are limited to the textual domain and cannot account for the major role that non-verbal cues play in understanding social situations. Vision Language Models (VLMs) can potentially account for this gap, however their ability to make correct inferences over such social cues has received little attention. In this paper, we explore the capabilities of VLMs at social reasoning. We identify a previously overlooked limitation in VLMs: the Visual Social-Pragmatic Inference gap. To target this gap, we propose a new task for VLMs: Visual Social-Pragmatic Inference. We construct a high quality dataset to test the abilities of a VLM for this task and benchmark the performance of several VLMs on it.

Effective social intelligence simulation requires language agents to dynamically adjust reasoning depth, a capability notably absent in current approaches. While existing methods either lack this kind of reasoning capability or enforce uniform long chain-of-thought reasoning across all scenarios, resulting in excessive token usage and inappropriate social simulation. In this paper, we propose Adaptive Mode Learning (AML) that strategically selects from four thinking modes (intuitive reaction rightarrow deep contemplation) based on real-time context. Our framework's core innovation, the Adaptive Mode Policy Optimization (AMPO) algorithm, introduces three key advancements over existing methods: (1) Multi-granular thinking mode design, (2) Context-aware mode switching across social interaction, and (3) Token-efficient reasoning via depth-adaptive processing. Extensive experiments on social intelligence tasks confirm that AML achieves 15.6% higher task performance than state-of-the-art methods. Notably, our method outperforms GRPO by 7.0% with 32.8% shorter reasoning chains. These results demonstrate that context-sensitive thinking mode selection, as implemented in AMPO, enables more human-like adaptive reasoning than GRPO's fixed-depth approach

Contemporary approaches to agent-based modeling (ABM) of social systems have traditionally emphasized rule-based behaviors, limiting their ability to capture nuanced dynamics by moving beyond predefined rules and leveraging contextual understanding from LMs of human social interaction. This paper presents SALM (Social Agent LM Framework), a novel approach for integrating language models (LMs) into social network simulation that achieves unprecedented temporal stability in multi-agent scenarios. Our primary contributions include: (1) a hierarchical prompting architecture enabling stable simulation beyond 4,000 timesteps while reducing token usage by 73%, (2) an attention-based memory system achieving 80% cache hit rates (95% CI [78%, 82%]) with sub-linear memory growth of 9.5%, and (3) formal bounds on personality stability. Through extensive validation against SNAP ego networks, we demonstrate the first LLM-based framework capable of modeling long-term social phenomena while maintaining empirically validated behavioral fidelity.

Making theory-of-mind inferences from human dialogue is a strong indicator of a model's underlying social abilities, which are fundamental for adept AI assistants. However, large language and reasoning models struggle to understand sophisticated social phenomena in transcript data, such as sarcasm and irony. To assess the weaknesses of current models and to identify their solutions, we introduce SocialNLI (SoNLI) -- the first social dialogue inference dataset. SoNLI consists of a collection of dialogue transcripts hand-picked to center complex social nuances like irony and sarcasm, paired with inferences, corresponding likelihood scores, and human-written explanations. We explore social inference analysis as a facet of theory-of-mind, and evaluate LLM and reasoning model theory-of-mind ability through multi-step counterfactual reasoning.

Despite the recent successes of vanilla Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) on many tasks, their foundation on pairwise interaction networks inherently limits their capacity to discern latent higher-order interactions in complex systems. To bridge this capability gap, we propose a novel approach exploiting the rich mathematical theory of simplicial complexes (SCs) - a robust tool for modeling higher-order interactions. Current SC-based GNNs are burdened by high complexity and rigidity, and quantifying higher-order interaction strengths remains challenging. Innovatively, we present a higher-order Flower-Petals (FP) model, incorporating FP Laplacians into SCs. Further, we introduce a Higher-order Graph Convolutional Network (HiGCN) grounded in FP Laplacians, capable of discerning intrinsic features across varying topological scales. By employing learnable graph filters, a parameter group within each FP Laplacian domain, we can identify diverse patterns where the filters' weights serve as a quantifiable measure of higher-order interaction strengths. The theoretical underpinnings of HiGCN's advanced expressiveness are rigorously demonstrated. Additionally, our empirical investigations reveal that the proposed model accomplishes state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on a range of graph tasks and provides a scalable and flexible solution to explore higher-order interactions in graphs.

The rich and multifaceted nature of human social interaction, encompassing multimodal cues, unobservable relations and mental states, and dynamical behavior, presents a formidable challenge for artificial intelligence. To advance research in this area, we introduce SIV-Bench, a novel video benchmark for rigorously evaluating the capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) across Social Scene Understanding (SSU), Social State Reasoning (SSR), and Social Dynamics Prediction (SDP). SIV-Bench features 2,792 video clips and 8,792 meticulously generated question-answer pairs derived from a human-LLM collaborative pipeline. It is originally collected from TikTok and YouTube, covering a wide range of video genres, presentation styles, and linguistic and cultural backgrounds. It also includes a dedicated setup for analyzing the impact of different textual cues-original on-screen text, added dialogue, or no text. Our comprehensive experiments on leading MLLMs reveal that while models adeptly handle SSU, they significantly struggle with SSR and SDP, where Relation Inference (RI) is an acute bottleneck, as further examined in our analysis. Our study also confirms the critical role of transcribed dialogue in aiding comprehension of complex social interactions. By systematically identifying current MLLMs' strengths and limitations, SIV-Bench offers crucial insights to steer the development of more socially intelligent AI. The dataset and code are available at https://kfq20.github.io/sivbench/.

Reasoning ability is one of the most crucial capabilities of a foundation model, signifying its capacity to address complex reasoning tasks. Chain-of-Thought (CoT) technique is widely regarded as one of the effective methods for enhancing the reasoning ability of foundation models and has garnered significant attention. However, the reasoning process of CoT is linear, step-by-step, similar to personal logical reasoning, suitable for solving general and slightly complicated problems. On the contrary, the thinking pattern of an expert owns two prominent characteristics that cannot be handled appropriately in CoT, i.e., high-order multi-hop reasoning and multimodal comparative judgement. Therefore, the core motivation of this paper is transcending CoT to construct a reasoning paradigm that can think like an expert. The hyperedge of a hypergraph could connect various vertices, making it naturally suitable for modelling high-order relationships. Inspired by this, this paper innovatively proposes a multimodal Hypergraph-of-Thought (HoT) reasoning paradigm, which enables the foundation models to possess the expert-level ability of high-order multi-hop reasoning and multimodal comparative judgement. Specifically, a textual hypergraph-of-thought is constructed utilizing triple as the primary thought to model higher-order relationships, and a hyperedge-of-thought is generated through multi-hop walking paths to achieve multi-hop inference. Furthermore, we devise a visual hypergraph-of-thought to interact with the textual hypergraph-of-thought via Cross-modal Co-Attention Graph Learning for multimodal comparative verification. Experimentations on the ScienceQA benchmark demonstrate the proposed HoT-based T5 outperforms CoT-based GPT3.5 and chatGPT, which is on par with CoT-based GPT4 with a lower model size.

Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant progress in IQ-related domains that require careful thinking, such as mathematics and coding. However, enhancing LLMs' cognitive development in social domains, particularly from a post-training perspective, remains underexplored. Recognizing that the social world follows a distinct timeline and requires a richer blend of cognitive modes (from intuitive reactions (System 1) and surface-level thinking to deliberate thinking (System 2)) than mathematics, which primarily relies on System 2 cognition (careful, step-by-step reasoning), we introduce Temporal-aware Hierarchical Cognitive Reinforcement Learning (TimeHC-RL) for enhancing LLMs' social intelligence. In our experiments, we systematically explore improving LLMs' social intelligence and validate the effectiveness of the TimeHC-RL method, through five other post-training paradigms and two test-time intervention paradigms on eight datasets with diverse data patterns. Experimental results reveal the superiority of our proposed TimeHC-RL method compared to the widely adopted System 2 RL method. It gives the 7B backbone model wings, enabling it to rival the performance of advanced models like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-O3. Additionally, the systematic exploration from post-training and test-time interventions perspectives to improve LLMs' social intelligence has uncovered several valuable insights.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-an understanding of the mental states of others-is a key aspect of human social intelligence, yet, chatbots and LLM-based social agents do not typically integrate it. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs that explicitly use ToM get better at dialogue, achieving goals more effectively. After showing that simply prompting models to generate mental states between dialogue turns already provides significant benefit, we further introduce ToMAgent (ToMA), a ToM-focused dialogue agent. ToMA is trained by pairing ToM with dialogue lookahead to produce mental states that are maximally useful for achieving dialogue goals. Experiments on the Sotopia interactive social evaluation benchmark demonstrate the effectiveness of our method over a range of baselines. Comprehensive analysis shows that ToMA exhibits more strategic, goal-oriented reasoning behaviors, which enable long-horizon adaptation, while maintaining better relationships with their partners. Our results suggest a step forward in integrating ToM for building socially intelligent LLM agents.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

The rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs) and their capacity to simulate human cognition and behavior has given rise to LLM-based frameworks and tools that are evaluated and applied based on their ability to perform tasks traditionally performed by humans, namely those involving cognition, decision-making, and social interaction. This survey provides a comprehensive examination of such human-centric LLM capabilities, focusing on their performance in both individual tasks (where an LLM acts as a stand-in for a single human) and collective tasks (where multiple LLMs coordinate to mimic group dynamics). We first evaluate LLM competencies across key areas including reasoning, perception, and social cognition, comparing their abilities to human-like skills. Then, we explore real-world applications of LLMs in human-centric domains such as behavioral science, political science, and sociology, assessing their effectiveness in replicating human behaviors and interactions. Finally, we identify challenges and future research directions, such as improving LLM adaptability, emotional intelligence, and cultural sensitivity, while addressing inherent biases and enhancing frameworks for human-AI collaboration. This survey aims to provide a foundational understanding of LLMs from a human-centric perspective, offering insights into their current capabilities and potential for future development.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

We present NormBank, a knowledge bank of 155k situational norms. This resource is designed to ground flexible normative reasoning for interactive, assistive, and collaborative AI systems. Unlike prior commonsense resources, NormBank grounds each inference within a multivalent sociocultural frame, which includes the setting (e.g., restaurant), the agents' contingent roles (waiter, customer), their attributes (age, gender), and other physical, social, and cultural constraints (e.g., the temperature or the country of operation). In total, NormBank contains 63k unique constraints from a taxonomy that we introduce and iteratively refine here. Constraints then apply in different combinations to frame social norms. Under these manipulations, norms are non-monotonic - one can cancel an inference by updating its frame even slightly. Still, we find evidence that neural models can help reliably extend the scope and coverage of NormBank. We further demonstrate the utility of this resource with a series of transfer experiments.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Understanding emotions is fundamental to human interaction and experience. Humans easily infer emotions from situations or facial expressions, situations from emotions, and do a variety of other affective cognition. How adept is modern AI at these inferences? We introduce an evaluation framework for testing affective cognition in foundation models. Starting from psychological theory, we generate 1,280 diverse scenarios exploring relationships between appraisals, emotions, expressions, and outcomes. We evaluate the abilities of foundation models (GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini-1.5-Pro) and humans (N = 567) across carefully selected conditions. Our results show foundation models tend to agree with human intuitions, matching or exceeding interparticipant agreement. In some conditions, models are ``superhuman'' -- they better predict modal human judgements than the average human. All models benefit from chain-of-thought reasoning. This suggests foundation models have acquired a human-like understanding of emotions and their influence on beliefs and behavior.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

Humans intuitively navigate social interactions by simulating unspoken dynamics and reasoning about others' perspectives, even with limited information. In contrast, AI systems struggle to automatically structure and reason about these implicit social contexts. In this paper, we introduce a novel structured social world representation formalism (S3AP), designed to help AI systems reason more effectively about social dynamics. Following a POMDP-driven design, S3AP represents social interactions as structured tuples, such as state, observation, agent actions, and mental states, which can be automatically induced from free-form narratives or other inputs. We first show S3AP can help LLMs better understand social narratives across 5 social reasoning tasks (e.g., +51% improvement on FANToM's theory-of-mind reasoning with OpenAI's o1), reaching new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance. We then induce social world models from these structured representations, demonstrating their ability to predict future social dynamics and improve agent decision-making, yielding up to +18% improvement on the SOTOPIA social interaction benchmark. Our findings highlight the promise of S3AP as a powerful, general-purpose representation for social world states, enabling the development of more socially-aware systems that better navigate social interactions.

This work addresses a new challenge of understanding human nonverbal interaction in social contexts. Nonverbal signals pervade virtually every communicative act. Our gestures, facial expressions, postures, gaze, even physical appearance all convey messages, without anything being said. Despite their critical role in social life, nonverbal signals receive very limited attention as compared to the linguistic counterparts, and existing solutions typically examine nonverbal cues in isolation. Our study marks the first systematic effort to enhance the interpretation of multifaceted nonverbal signals. First, we contribute a novel large-scale dataset, called NVI, which is meticulously annotated to include bounding boxes for humans and corresponding social groups, along with 22 atomic-level nonverbal behaviors under five broad interaction types. Second, we establish a new task NVI-DET for nonverbal interaction detection, which is formalized as identifying triplets in the form <individual, group, interaction> from images. Third, we propose a nonverbal interaction detection hypergraph (NVI-DEHR), a new approach that explicitly models high-order nonverbal interactions using hypergraphs. Central to the model is a dual multi-scale hypergraph that adeptly addresses individual-to-individual and group-to-group correlations across varying scales, facilitating interactional feature learning and eventually improving interaction prediction. Extensive experiments on NVI show that NVI-DEHR improves various baselines significantly in NVI-DET. It also exhibits leading performance on HOI-DET, confirming its versatility in supporting related tasks and strong generalization ability. We hope that our study will offer the community new avenues to explore nonverbal signals in more depth.

Chain-of-thought prompting (e.g., "Let's think step-by-step") primes large language models to verbalize rationalization for their predictions. While chain-of-thought can lead to dramatic performance gains, benefits appear to emerge only for sufficiently large models (beyond 50B parameters). We show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (125M -- 1.3B parameters) can still benefit from chain-of-thought prompting. To achieve this, we introduce Symbolic Chain-of-Thought Distillation (SCoTD), a method to train a smaller student model on rationalizations sampled from a significantly larger teacher model. Experiments across several commonsense benchmarks show that: 1) SCoTD enhances the performance of the student model in both supervised and few-shot settings, and especially for challenge sets; 2) sampling many reasoning chains per instance from the teacher is paramount; and 3) after distillation, student chain-of-thoughts are judged by humans as comparable to the teacher, despite orders of magnitude fewer parameters. We test several hypotheses regarding what properties of chain-of-thought samples are important, e.g., diversity vs. teacher likelihood vs. open-endedness. We release our corpus of chain-of-thought samples and code.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of simulating human behavior, offering cost-effective ways to estimate user responses during the early phases of survey design. While previous studies have examined whether models can reflect individual opinions or attitudes, we argue that a higher-order binding of virtual personas requires successfully approximating not only the opinions of a user as an identified member of a group, but also the nuanced ways in which that user perceives and evaluates those outside the group. In particular, faithfully simulating how humans perceive different social groups is critical for applying LLMs to various political science studies, including timely topics on polarization dynamics, inter-group conflict, and democratic backsliding. To this end, we propose a novel methodology for constructing virtual personas with synthetic user ``backstories" generated as extended, multi-turn interview transcripts. Our generated backstories are longer, rich in detail, and consistent in authentically describing a singular individual, compared to previous methods. We show that virtual personas conditioned on our backstories closely replicate human response distributions (up to an 87\% improvement as measured by Wasserstein Distance) and produce effect sizes that closely match those observed in the original studies. Altogether, our work extends the applicability of LLMs beyond estimating individual self-opinions, enabling their use in a broader range of human studies.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

Humans talk in free-form while negotiating the expressed meanings or common ground. Despite the impressive conversational abilities of the large generative language models, they do not consider the individual differences in contextual understanding in a shared situated environment. In this work, we propose MindDial, a novel conversational framework that can generate situated free-form responses to negotiate common ground. We design an explicit mind module that can track three-level beliefs -- the speaker's belief, the speaker's prediction of the listener's belief, and the common belief based on the gap between the first two. Then the speaking act classification head will decide to continue to talk, end this turn, or take task-related action. We augment a common ground alignment dataset MutualFriend with belief dynamics annotation, of which the goal is to find a single mutual friend based on the free chat between two agents. Experiments show that our model with mental state modeling can resemble human responses when aligning common ground meanwhile mimic the natural human conversation flow. The ablation study further validates the third-level common belief can aggregate information of the first and second-order beliefs and align common ground more efficiently.

When researchers claim AI systems possess ToM or mental models, they are fundamentally discussing behavioral predictions and bias corrections rather than genuine mental states. This position paper argues that the current discourse conflates sophisticated pattern matching with authentic cognition, missing a crucial distinction between simulation and experience. While recent studies show LLMs achieving human-level performance on ToM laboratory tasks, these results are based only on behavioral mimicry. More importantly, the entire testing paradigm may be flawed in applying individual human cognitive tests to AI systems, but assessing human cognition directly in the moment of human-AI interaction. I suggest shifting focus toward mutual ToM frameworks that acknowledge the simultaneous contributions of human cognition and AI algorithms, emphasizing the interaction dynamics, instead of testing AI in isolation.

Can machines truly think, reason and act in domains like humans? This enduring question continues to shape the pursuit of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Despite the growing capabilities of models such as GPT-4.5, DeepSeek, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Phi-4, and Grok 3, which exhibit multimodal fluency and partial reasoning, these systems remain fundamentally limited by their reliance on token-level prediction and lack of grounded agency. This paper offers a cross-disciplinary synthesis of AGI development, spanning artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, psychology, generative models, and agent-based systems. We analyze the architectural and cognitive foundations of general intelligence, highlighting the role of modular reasoning, persistent memory, and multi-agent coordination. In particular, we emphasize the rise of Agentic RAG frameworks that combine retrieval, planning, and dynamic tool use to enable more adaptive behavior. We discuss generalization strategies, including information compression, test-time adaptation, and training-free methods, as critical pathways toward flexible, domain-agnostic intelligence. Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are reexamined not just as perception modules but as evolving interfaces for embodied understanding and collaborative task completion. We also argue that true intelligence arises not from scale alone but from the integration of memory and reasoning: an orchestration of modular, interactive, and self-improving components where compression enables adaptive behavior. Drawing on advances in neurosymbolic systems, reinforcement learning, and cognitive scaffolding, we explore how recent architectures begin to bridge the gap between statistical learning and goal-directed cognition. Finally, we identify key scientific, technical, and ethical challenges on the path to AGI.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Generating a Chain of Thought (CoT) has been shown to consistently improve large language model (LLM) performance on a wide range of NLP tasks. However, prior work has mainly focused on logical reasoning tasks (e.g. arithmetic, commonsense QA); it remains unclear whether improvements hold for more diverse types of reasoning, especially in socially situated contexts. Concretely, we perform a controlled evaluation of zero-shot CoT across two socially sensitive domains: harmful questions and stereotype benchmarks. We find that zero-shot CoT reasoning in sensitive domains significantly increases a model's likelihood to produce harmful or undesirable output, with trends holding across different prompt formats and model variants. Furthermore, we show that harmful CoTs increase with model size, but decrease with improved instruction following. Our work suggests that zero-shot CoT should be used with caution on socially important tasks, especially when marginalized groups or sensitive topics are involved.

Recent advances in large language models (LLM) have enabled richer social simulations, allowing for the study of various social phenomena with LLM-based agents. However, most work has used an omniscient perspective on these simulations (e.g., single LLM to generate all interlocutors), which is fundamentally at odds with the non-omniscient, information asymmetric interactions that humans have. To examine these differences, we develop an evaluation framework to simulate social interactions with LLMs in various settings (omniscient, non-omniscient). Our experiments show that interlocutors simulated omnisciently are much more successful at accomplishing social goals compared to non-omniscient agents, despite the latter being the more realistic setting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that learning from omniscient simulations improves the apparent naturalness of interactions but scarcely enhances goal achievement in cooperative scenarios. Our findings indicate that addressing information asymmetry remains a fundamental challenge for LLM-based agents.

Theory of Mind (ToM) can be used to assess the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in complex scenarios where social reasoning is required. While the research community has proposed many ToM benchmarks, their hardness varies greatly, and their complexity is not well defined. This work proposes a framework inspired by cognitive load theory to measure the complexity of ToM tasks. We quantify a problem's complexity as the number of states necessary to solve it correctly. Our complexity measure also accounts for spurious states of a ToM problem designed to make it apparently harder. We use our method to assess the complexity of five widely adopted ToM benchmarks. On top of this framework, we design a prompting technique that augments the information available to a model with a description of how the environment changes with the agents' interactions. We name this technique Discrete World Models (DWM) and show how it elicits superior performance on ToM tasks.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the cognitive ability to infer and attribute mental states to oneself and others. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated for social and cognitive capabilities, it remains unclear to what extent these models demonstrate ToM across diverse languages and cultural contexts. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive study of multilingual ToM capabilities aimed at addressing this gap. Our approach includes two key components: (1) We translate existing ToM datasets into multiple languages, effectively creating a multilingual ToM dataset and (2) We enrich these translations with culturally specific elements to reflect the social and cognitive scenarios relevant to diverse populations. We conduct extensive evaluations of six state-of-the-art LLMs to measure their ToM performance across both the translated and culturally adapted datasets. The results highlight the influence of linguistic and cultural diversity on the models' ability to exhibit ToM, and questions their social reasoning capabilities. This work lays the groundwork for future research into enhancing LLMs' cross-cultural social cognition and contributes to the development of more culturally aware and socially intelligent AI systems. All our data and code are publicly available.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Current large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated emerging capabilities in social intelligence tasks, including implicature resolution (Sravanthi et al. (2024)) and theory-of-mind reasoning (Shapira et al. (2024)), both of which require substantial pragmatic understanding. However, how LLMs acquire this competence throughout the training process remains poorly understood. In this work, we introduce ALTPRAG, a dataset grounded in the pragmatic concept of alternatives, designed to evaluate whether LLMs at different training stages can accurately infer nuanced speaker intentions. Each instance pairs two contextually appropriate but pragmatically distinct continuations, enabling fine-grained assessment of both pragmatic interpretation and contrastive reasoning. We systematically evaluate 22 LLMs across key training stages: pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and preference optimization, to examine the development of pragmatic competence. Our results show that even base models exhibit notable sensitivity to pragmatic cues, which improves consistently with increases in model and data scale. Additionally, SFT and RLHF contribute further gains, particularly in cognitive-pragmatic reasoning. These findings highlight pragmatic competence as an emergent and compositional property of LLM training and offer new insights for aligning models with human communicative norms.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Multi-party Conversational Agents (MPCAs) are systems designed to engage in dialogue with more than two participants simultaneously. Unlike traditional two-party agents, designing MPCAs faces additional challenges due to the need to interpret both utterance semantics and social dynamics. This survey explores recent progress in MPCAs by addressing three key questions: 1) Can agents model each participants' mental states? (State of Mind Modeling); 2) Can they properly understand the dialogue content? (Semantic Understanding); and 3) Can they reason about and predict future conversation flow? (Agent Action Modeling). We review methods ranging from classical machine learning to Large Language Models (LLMs) and multi-modal systems. Our analysis underscores Theory of Mind (ToM) as essential for building intelligent MPCAs and highlights multi-modal understanding as a promising yet underexplored direction. Finally, this survey offers guidance to future researchers on developing more capable MPCAs.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Images usually convey richer detail than text, but often include redundant information which potentially downgrades multimodal reasoning performance. When faced with lengthy or complex messages, humans tend to employ abstract thinking to convert them into simple and concise abstracts. Inspired by this cognitive strategy, we introduce Visual Abstract Thinking (VAT), a novel thinking paradigm that prompts Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) with visual abstract instead of explicit verbal thoughts or elaborate guidance, permitting a more concentrated visual reasoning mechanism. Explicit thinking, such as Chain-of-thought (CoT) or tool-augmented approaches, increases the complexity of reasoning process via inserting verbose intermediate steps, external knowledge or visual information. In contrast, VAT reduces redundant visual information and encourages models to focus their reasoning on more essential visual elements. Experimental results show that VAT consistently empowers different models, and achieves an average gain of 17% over GPT-4o baseline by employing diverse types of visual abstracts, demonstrating that VAT can enhance visual reasoning abilities for MLLMs regarding conceptual, structural and relational reasoning tasks. VAT is also compatible with CoT in knowledge-intensive multimodal reasoning tasks. These findings highlight the effectiveness of visual reasoning via abstract thinking and encourage further exploration of more diverse reasoning paradigms from the perspective of human cognition.

We present a new challenge to examine whether large language models understand social norms. In contrast to existing datasets, our dataset requires a fundamental understanding of social norms to solve. Our dataset features the largest set of social norm skills, consisting of 402 skills and 12,383 questions covering a wide set of social norms ranging from opinions and arguments to culture and laws. We design our dataset according to the K-12 curriculum. This enables the direct comparison of the social understanding of large language models to humans, more specifically, elementary students. While prior work generates nearly random accuracy on our benchmark, recent large language models such as GPT3.5-Turbo and LLaMA2-Chat are able to improve the performance significantly, only slightly below human performance. We then propose a multi-agent framework based on large language models to improve the models' ability to understand social norms. This method further improves large language models to be on par with humans. Given the increasing adoption of large language models in real-world applications, our finding is particularly important and presents a unique direction for future improvements.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) strive to achieve a profound, human-like understanding of and interaction with the physical world, but often exhibit a shallow and incoherent integration when acquiring information (Perception) and conducting reasoning (Cognition). This disconnect leads to a spectrum of reasoning failures, with hallucination being the most prominent. Collectively, these issues expose a fundamental challenge: the ability to process pixels does not yet confer the ability to construct a coherent, credible internal world model. To systematically dissect and address this challenge, this survey introduces a novel and unified analytical framework: ``From Perception to Cognition." We deconstruct the complex process of vision-language interactive understanding into two interdependent layers: Perception, the foundational ability to accurately extract visual information and achieve fine-grained alignment with textual instructions; and Cognition, the higher-order capability for proactive, multi-step, goal-oriented reasoning built upon this perceptual foundation, the core of which is the formation of a dynamic observe-think-verify reasoning loop. Guided by this framework, this paper systematically analyzes the key bottlenecks of current MLLMs at both layers. It surveys the landscape of cutting-edge methods designed to address these challenges, spanning from techniques that enhance low-level visual representations to those that improve high-level reasoning paradigms. Furthermore, we review critical benchmarks and delineate future research directions. This survey aims to provide the research community with a clear, structured perspective for understanding the intrinsic limitations of current MLLMs and to illuminate the path toward building next-generation models capable of deep reasoning and a genuine understanding of the world.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly participate in human-AI interactions, evaluating their Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities - particularly their ability to track dynamic mental states - becomes crucial. While existing benchmarks assess basic ToM abilities, they predominantly focus on static snapshots of mental states, overlooking the temporal evolution that characterizes real-world social interactions. We present DynToM, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to understand and track the temporal progression of mental states across interconnected scenarios. Through a systematic four-step framework, we generate 1,100 social contexts encompassing 5,500 scenarios and 78,100 questions, each validated for realism and quality. Our comprehensive evaluation of ten state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that their average performance underperforms humans by 44.7\%, with performance degrading significantly when tracking and reasoning about the shift of mental states. This performance gap highlights fundamental limitations in current LLMs' ability to model the dynamic nature of human mental states.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning but can still exhibit harmful behaviors. Current alignment strategies typically embed safety into model weights, making these controls implicit, static, and difficult to modify. This paper introduces Cognition-of-Thought (CooT), a novel decoding-time framework that equips LLMs with an explicit cognitive self-monitoring loop. CooT couples a standard text Generator with a cognitive Perceiver that continuously monitors the unfolding sequence. The Perceiver uses a structured, precedence-based hierarchy of principles (e.g., safety over obedience) to detect potential misalignments as they arise. When violations are flagged, CooT intervenes by rolling back the generation to the point of error and regenerating under injected guidance that combines universal social priors with context-specific warnings. CooT thus transforms alignment from a fixed property into an explicit, dynamic, and auditable process active during inference, allowing for flexible policy updates without retraining the model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and model families confirm that CooT consistently improves safety and social reasoning performance.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting enables large language models to solve complex reasoning problems by generating intermediate steps. However, confined by its inherent single-pass and sequential generation process, CoT heavily relies on the initial decisions, causing errors in early steps to accumulate and impact the final answers. In contrast, humans adopt recursive thinking when tackling complex reasoning problems, i.e., iteratively breaking the original problem into approachable sub-problems and aggregating their answers to resolve the original one. Inspired by the human cognitive process, we propose SOCRATIC QUESTIONING, a divide-and-conquer style algorithm that mimics the recursive thinking process. Specifically, SOCRATIC QUESTIONING leverages large language models to raise and answer sub-questions until collecting enough information to tackle the original question. Unlike CoT, SOCRATIC QUESTIONING explicitly navigates the thinking space, stimulates effective recursive thinking, and is more robust towards errors in the thinking process. Extensive experiments on several complex reasoning tasks, including MMLU, MATH, LogiQA, and visual question-answering demonstrate significant performance improvements over the state-of-the-art prompting methods, such as CoT, and Tree-of-Thought. The qualitative analysis clearly shows that the intermediate reasoning steps elicited by SOCRATIC QUESTIONING are similar to humans' recursively thinking process of complex reasoning problems.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced the integration of visual and linguistic modalities, establishing themselves as the dominant paradigm for visual-language tasks. Current approaches like chain of thought (CoT) reasoning have augmented the cognitive capabilities of large language models (LLMs), yet their adaptation to MLLMs is hindered by heightened risks of hallucination in cross-modality comprehension. In this paper, we find that the thinking while looking paradigm in current multimodal CoT approaches--where reasoning chains are generated alongside visual input--fails to mitigate hallucinations caused by misleading images. To address these limitations, we propose the Visual Inference Chain (VIC) framework, a novel approach that constructs reasoning chains using textual context alone before introducing visual input, effectively reducing cross-modal biases and enhancing multimodal reasoning accuracy. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that VIC significantly improves zero-shot performance across various vision-related tasks, mitigating hallucinations while refining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. Our code repository can be found at https://github.com/Terry-Xu-666/visual_inference_chain.

Human activity is moderated by norms. When performing actions in the real world, humans not only follow norms, but also consider the trade-off between different norms However, machines are often trained without explicit supervision on norm understanding and reasoning, especially when the norms are grounded in a physical and social context. To improve and evaluate the normative reasoning capability of vision-language models (VLMs), we present EgoNormia |epsilon|, consisting of 1,853 ego-centric videos of human interactions, each of which has two related questions evaluating both the prediction and justification of normative actions. The normative actions encompass seven categories: safety, privacy, proxemics, politeness, cooperation, coordination/proactivity, and communication/legibility. To compile this dataset at scale, we propose a novel pipeline leveraging video sampling, automatic answer generation, filtering, and human validation. Our work demonstrates that current state-of-the-art vision-language models lack robust norm understanding, scoring a maximum of 45% on EgoNormia (versus a human bench of 92%). Our analysis of performance in each dimension highlights the significant risks of safety, privacy, and the lack of collaboration and communication capability when applied to real-world agents. We additionally show that through a retrieval-based generation method, it is possible to use EgoNomia to enhance normative reasoning in VLMs.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has catalyzed a transformative shift in artificial intelligence, paving the way for advanced intelligent agents capable of sophisticated reasoning, robust perception, and versatile action across diverse domains. As these agents increasingly drive AI research and practical applications, their design, evaluation, and continuous improvement present intricate, multifaceted challenges. This survey provides a comprehensive overview, framing intelligent agents within a modular, brain-inspired architecture that integrates principles from cognitive science, neuroscience, and computational research. We structure our exploration into four interconnected parts. First, we delve into the modular foundation of intelligent agents, systematically mapping their cognitive, perceptual, and operational modules onto analogous human brain functionalities, and elucidating core components such as memory, world modeling, reward processing, and emotion-like systems. Second, we discuss self-enhancement and adaptive evolution mechanisms, exploring how agents autonomously refine their capabilities, adapt to dynamic environments, and achieve continual learning through automated optimization paradigms, including emerging AutoML and LLM-driven optimization strategies. Third, we examine collaborative and evolutionary multi-agent systems, investigating the collective intelligence emerging from agent interactions, cooperation, and societal structures, highlighting parallels to human social dynamics. Finally, we address the critical imperative of building safe, secure, and beneficial AI systems, emphasizing intrinsic and extrinsic security threats, ethical alignment, robustness, and practical mitigation strategies necessary for trustworthy real-world deployment.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

Human cognitive behavior arises from the interaction of specialized brain networks dedicated to distinct functions, such as language, logic, and social reasoning. Inspired by this organization, we propose Mixture of Cognitive Reasoners (MiCRo): a modular, transformer-based architecture post-trained with a curriculum that induces functional specialization across experts. Concretely, we partition the layers of a pretrained language model into four expert modules aligned with well-studied cognitive networks in the human brain. MiCRo offers three key advantages over standard language models. (1) The specialized experts are interpretable and causally meaningful -- ablating a module causes substantial drops on benchmarks requiring its specialized domain. (2) MiCRo's behavior can be dynamically steered at inference time by routing tokens to particular experts (e.g., favoring social over logical reasoning), enabling fine-grained control over outputs. (3) MiCRo outperforms or matches comparable baselines on both machine-learning reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, BBH) and alignment to human behavior (CogBench), while maintaining interpretability. Taken together, cognitively grounded functional specialization yields models that are both more human-like and more human-interpretable.

We study the emergence of agency from scratch by using Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents. In previous studies of LLM-based agents, each agent's characteristics, including personality and memory, have traditionally been predefined. We focused on how individuality, such as behavior, personality, and memory, can be differentiated from an undifferentiated state. The present LLM agents engage in cooperative communication within a group simulation, exchanging context-based messages in natural language. By analyzing this multi-agent simulation, we report valuable new insights into how social norms, cooperation, and personality traits can emerge spontaneously. This paper demonstrates that autonomously interacting LLM-powered agents generate hallucinations and hashtags to sustain communication, which, in turn, increases the diversity of words within their interactions. Each agent's emotions shift through communication, and as they form communities, the personalities of the agents emerge and evolve accordingly. This computational modeling approach and its findings will provide a new method for analyzing collective artificial intelligence.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand the mental states of oneself and others, remains a challenging area for large language models (LLMs), which often fail to predict human mental states accurately. In this paper, we introduce UniToMBench, a unified benchmark that integrates the strengths of SimToM and TOMBENCH to systematically improve and assess ToM capabilities in LLMs by integrating multi-interaction task designs and evolving story scenarios. Supported by a custom dataset of over 1,000 hand-written scenarios, UniToMBench combines perspective-taking techniques with diverse evaluation metrics to better stimulate social cognition in LLMs. Through evaluation, we observe that while models like GPT-4o and GPT-4o Mini show consistently high accuracy in tasks involving emotional and belief-related scenarios, with results usually above 80%, there is significant variability in their performance across knowledge-based tasks. These results highlight both the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in ToM-related tasks, underscoring the value of UniToMBench as a comprehensive tool for future development. Our code is publicly available here: https://github.com/Shamant/unifiedtombenchmark.

As large language models evolve, there is growing anticipation that they will emulate human-like Theory of Mind (ToM) to assist with routine tasks. However, existing methods for evaluating machine ToM focus primarily on unimodal models and largely treat these models as black boxes, lacking an interpretative exploration of their internal mechanisms. In response, this study adopts an approach based on internal mechanisms to provide an interpretability-driven assessment of ToM in multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Specifically, we first construct a multimodal ToM test dataset, GridToM, which incorporates diverse belief testing tasks and perceptual information from multiple perspectives. Next, our analysis shows that attention heads in multimodal large models can distinguish cognitive information across perspectives, providing evidence of ToM capabilities. Furthermore, we present a lightweight, training-free approach that significantly enhances the model's exhibited ToM by adjusting in the direction of the attention head.

Socially intelligent AI that can understand and interact seamlessly with humans in daily lives is increasingly important as AI becomes more closely integrated with peoples' daily activities. However, current works in artificial social reasoning all rely on language-only, or language-dominant approaches to benchmark and training models, resulting in systems that are improving in verbal communication but struggle with nonverbal social understanding. To address this limitation, we tap into a novel source of data rich in nonverbal and social interactions -- mime videos. Mimes refer to the art of expression through gesture and movement without spoken words, which presents unique challenges and opportunities in interpreting non-verbal social communication. We contribute a new dataset called MimeQA, obtained by sourcing 221 videos from YouTube, through rigorous annotation and verification, resulting in a benchmark with 101 videos and 806 question-answer pairs. Using MimeQA, we evaluate state-of-the-art video large language models (vLLMs) and find that their overall accuracy ranges from 15-30%. Our analysis reveals that vLLMs often fail to ground imagined objects and over-rely on the text prompt while ignoring subtle nonverbal interactions. Our data resources are released at https://github.com/MIT-MI/MimeQA to inspire future work in foundation models that embody true social intelligence capable of interpreting non-verbal human interactions.

The field of artificial intelligence has seen explosive growth and exponential success. The last phase of development showcased deep learnings ability to solve a variety of difficult problems across a multitude of domains. Many of these networks met and exceeded human benchmarks by becoming experts in the domains in which they are trained. Though the successes of artificial intelligence have begun to overshadow its failures, there is still much that separates current artificial intelligence tools from becoming the exceptional general learners that humans are. In this paper, we identify the ten commandments upon which human intelligence is systematically and hierarchically built. We believe these commandments work collectively to serve as the essential ingredients that lead to the emergence of higher-order cognition and intelligence. This paper discusses a computational framework that could house these ten commandments and suggests new architectural modifications that could lead to the development of smarter, more explainable, and generalizable artificial systems inspired by a neuromorphic approach.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer mental states in others, is pivotal for human social cognition. Existing evaluations of ToM in LLMs are largely limited to English, neglecting the linguistic diversity that shapes human cognition. This limitation raises a critical question: can LLMs exhibit Multilingual Theory of Mind, which is the capacity to reason about mental states across diverse linguistic contexts? To address this gap, we present XToM, a rigorously validated multilingual benchmark that evaluates ToM across five languages and incorporates diverse, contextually rich task scenarios. Using XToM, we systematically evaluate LLMs (e.g., DeepSeek R1), revealing a pronounced dissonance: while models excel in multilingual language understanding, their ToM performance varies across languages. Our findings expose limitations in LLMs' ability to replicate human-like mentalizing across linguistic contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Social network simulation plays a crucial role in addressing various challenges within social science. It offers extensive applications such as state prediction, phenomena explanation, and policy-making support, among others. In this work, we harness the formidable human-like capabilities exhibited by large language models (LLMs) in sensing, reasoning, and behaving, and utilize these qualities to construct the S^3 system (short for Social network Simulation System). Adhering to the widely employed agent-based simulation paradigm, we employ prompt engineering and prompt tuning techniques to ensure that the agent's behavior closely emulates that of a genuine human within the social network. Specifically, we simulate three pivotal aspects: emotion, attitude, and interaction behaviors. By endowing the agent in the system with the ability to perceive the informational environment and emulate human actions, we observe the emergence of population-level phenomena, including the propagation of information, attitudes, and emotions. We conduct an evaluation encompassing two levels of simulation, employing real-world social network data. Encouragingly, the results demonstrate promising accuracy. This work represents an initial step in the realm of social network simulation empowered by LLM-based agents. We anticipate that our endeavors will serve as a source of inspiration for the development of simulation systems within, but not limited to, social science.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with the non-stationarity of multi-agent systems and fail to adaptively learn online when tested with novel agents. Here, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to create an autonomous agent that can handle these challenges. Our agent, Hypothetical Minds, consists of a cognitively-inspired architecture, featuring modular components for perception, memory, and hierarchical planning over two levels of abstraction. We introduce the Theory of Mind module that scaffolds the high-level planning process by generating hypotheses about other agents' strategies in natural language. It then evaluates and iteratively refines these hypotheses by reinforcing hypotheses that make correct predictions about the other agents' behavior. Hypothetical Minds significantly improves performance over previous LLM-agent and RL baselines on a range of competitive, mixed motive, and collaborative domains in the Melting Pot benchmark, including both dyadic and population-based environments. Additionally, comparisons against LLM-agent baselines and ablations reveal the importance of hypothesis evaluation and refinement for succeeding on complex scenarios.

Test-time compute has empowered multimodal large language models to generate extended reasoning chains, yielding strong performance on tasks such as multimodal math reasoning. However, this improved reasoning ability often comes with increased hallucination: as generations become longer, models tend to drift away from image-grounded content and rely more heavily on language priors. Attention analysis shows that longer reasoning chains lead to reduced focus on visual inputs, which contributes to hallucination. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce RH-AUC, a metric that quantifies how a model's perception accuracy changes with reasoning length, allowing us to evaluate whether the model preserves visual grounding during reasoning. We also release RH-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that spans a variety of multimodal tasks, designed to assess the trade-off between reasoning ability and hallucination. Our analysis reveals that (i) larger models typically achieve a better balance between reasoning and perception, and (ii) this balance is influenced more by the types and domains of training data than by its overall volume. These findings underscore the importance of evaluation frameworks that jointly consider both reasoning quality and perceptual fidelity.

Large language models' reasoning abilities benefit from methods that organize their thought processes, such as chain-of-thought prompting, which employs a sequential structure to guide the reasoning process step-by-step. However, existing approaches focus primarily on organizing the sequence of thoughts, leaving structure in individual thought steps underexplored. To address this gap, we propose Table as Thought, a framework inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories on human thought. Table as Thought organizes reasoning within a tabular schema, where rows represent sequential thought steps and columns capture critical constraints and contextual information to enhance reasoning. The reasoning process iteratively populates the table until self-verification ensures completeness and correctness. Our experiments show that Table as Thought excels in planning tasks and demonstrates a strong potential for enhancing LLM performance in mathematical reasoning compared to unstructured thought baselines. This work provides a novel exploration of refining thought representation within LLMs, paving the way for advancements in reasoning and AI cognition.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show immense promise for achieving truly human-like interactions, progress is hindered by the lack of fine-grained evaluation frameworks for human-centered scenarios, encompassing both the understanding of complex human intentions and the provision of empathetic, context-aware responses. Here we introduce HumanSense, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the human-centered perception and interaction capabilities of MLLMs, with a particular focus on deep understanding of extended multimodal contexts and the formulation of rational feedback. Our evaluation reveals that leading MLLMs still have considerable room for improvement, particularly for advanced interaction-oriented tasks. Supplementing visual input with audio and text information yields substantial improvements, and Omni-modal models show advantages on these tasks. Furthermore, we argue that appropriate feedback stems from a contextual analysis of the interlocutor's needs and emotions, with reasoning ability serving as the key to unlocking it. Accordingly, we employ a multi-stage, modality-progressive reinforcement learning to enhance the reasoning abilities of an Omni model, achieving substantial gains on evaluation results. Additionally, we observe that successful reasoning processes exhibit highly consistent thought patterns. By designing corresponding prompts, we also enhance the performance of non-reasoning models in a training-free manner. Project page: brightpinkhttps://digital-avatar.github.io/ai/HumanSense/

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Recent progress in multimodal reasoning has been significantly advanced by textual Chain-of-Thought (CoT), a paradigm where models conduct reasoning within language. This text-centric approach, however, treats vision as a static, initial context, creating a fundamental "semantic gap" between rich perceptual data and discrete symbolic thought. Human cognition often transcends language, utilizing vision as a dynamic mental sketchpad. A similar evolution is now unfolding in AI, marking a fundamental paradigm shift from models that merely think about images to those that can truly think with images. This emerging paradigm is characterized by models leveraging visual information as intermediate steps in their thought process, transforming vision from a passive input into a dynamic, manipulable cognitive workspace. In this survey, we chart this evolution of intelligence along a trajectory of increasing cognitive autonomy, which unfolds across three key stages: from external tool exploration, through programmatic manipulation, to intrinsic imagination. To structure this rapidly evolving field, our survey makes four key contributions. (1) We establish the foundational principles of the think with image paradigm and its three-stage framework. (2) We provide a comprehensive review of the core methods that characterize each stage of this roadmap. (3) We analyze the critical landscape of evaluation benchmarks and transformative applications. (4) We identify significant challenges and outline promising future directions. By providing this structured overview, we aim to offer a clear roadmap for future research towards more powerful and human-aligned multimodal AI.