Is it "possible" to accept a retributive theory of punishment, while simultaneously accepting a deterministic view of human behavior? Is belief in freewill a necessary condition for a belief that retributive punishments are ethical/correct? Under what set of assumptions are these ideas compatible?
122095
There are several ideas on hard determinism, but the core seems to be that in an interconnected existence, there can be no "actions" (free will), but only "reactions" (determinism). An action of free will would have to be a separate entity outside of existence, so we'd say it can't occur.   Now fast forward to Joe Schmo the robbing/murdering/rapist.  Joe wasn't born in some infinite bliss utopia, then decided one day to invent the concept of scumbaggery.  He's a product of an incomprehensible number of variables - maybe some are apparent like his dad was a violent alcoholic or whatever, but most likely it's far more complicated than that.    So that's fine - I get all that - but if that's the case, then how can you ethically deal with people like that?  You can't hardly let them do what they please at the expense of society, but then how can you get medieval on them when they're basically riding a wave?  I think that's a big reason why people fight concepts of determinism that mitigate or eradicate the concept of free will - now everyone has a license to do what they want and how can you punish them, it's not their fault!  How would/could/should you consolidate hard determinism with responding to criminal acts?
78481
I often hear that we are emotional beings, that we make decisions based on our feelings, mood and emotions. These decisions may not be logical and serve us best.  On the other hand some argue that we humans are logical beings, use logic and science to argue and build, and advance in life. So what is the verdict in your option or in the opinion of majority of philosophers, can humans be categorized as logical species or are most of our decisions emotional? If we are more emotional than logical then our intepretation of life and events happening around us is different than when we look at humans as entities making logical decisions that produce the same result. Can we say the creation of proper governments and physical tangle products such as structures are from the emotions?
83984
I was thinking of the sentence  "I think therefore I am",  which I had for a long time considered indisputable because it's self-evident.   Then I considered the hypothetical situation where my thoughts are illogical – and of course I can't be aware that they are – and so to a logical outsider I am not saying something that is actually indisputable and self-evident, but in fact may be total nonsense. Perhaps there is a hypothetical evil demon altering my ability to reason. However convincing it seems to me that I MUST exist since, in whatever since "I" or "exist" is, there is the ability to question whether I do, the conclusion can't actually be trusted without doubt since I cannot know if I am in fact reasoning logically.  Even what I consider to be trivial tautologies require this assumption of sanity, and therefore there is no true conclusion without assumption – an assumption about the nature of my own reasoning. The only absolute truth I have is unspeakable subjective experience, and any articulation (and I realize the apparent circular reasoning I've cornered myself into here...) is necessarily uncertain.  I realize that perhaps this doesn't even make sense, but was just curious if anyone had entertained this line of thought and come to some satisfying resolution.
119514
I've heard a lot about the supposed evils about not voting/voting for a 3rd party in recent political discussion here in the States. The reasoning seems to posit that (e.g.) in the Trump/Hillary race, refusing to vote for either party seems to morally support Trump, and voting for a party who is predictably never going to win is seen as just as of an immoral approach (within the context that a community of voters don't want Trump in power). Essentially, although both of these solutions would probably ultimately give Hillary a greater advantage, some voters would declare a failure to actively condemn/act against Trump immoral.  I've heard similar ethical reasoning in social situations. For instance, if a child is being bullied at school, and a bystander does nothing to help him, some might say that the bystander was acting immorally not because an indifference to helping people is bad, but because refusing to do so condones the bully's actions. Take another example from biblical hermeneutical disputes. Some say that the last passages of Colossians 3 condone slavery by remaining silent on the justice of the act.   Here's my question: Where is the line drawn between immoral inactivity and a simple lack of action? It seems to me that if I were to carry such principles to certain extremes, half of my life would all of a sudden become immoral because I would be somehow indirectly supporting some all-permeating kyriarchy, for instance, by not acting explicitly against it.   Additionally, Who are some thinkers who have written on the subject that I might be able to read?
54466
I was looking at , where in the asker was considering doing homework for students for a fee. My initial thought was that it's possible he went to the same university*, and if discovered they would attempt to revoke his degree. I considered that this would be analogous to failing and expelling a current student who was found to be breaking the academic honesty policy. I know that some universities have recently retracted honorary degrees awarded, but of course, the course work was never done to deserve these degrees. So my question is...  Is it possible for a university to retract a degree that had previously been awarded for a full course completion if the individual does something that would clearly harm the university/violate the ethics of the university?  *this is completely speculative, and the question is theoretical at best
24936
100 prisoners are imprisoned in solitary cells. Each cell is windowless and soundproof. There's a central living room with one light bulb; the bulb is initially off. No prisoner can see the light bulb from his or her own cell. Each day, the warden picks a prisoner equally at random, and that prisoner visits the central living room; at the end of the day the prisoner is returned to his cell. While in the living room, the prisoner can toggle the bulb if he or she wishes. Also, the prisoner has the option of asserting the claim that all 100 prisoners have been to the living room. If this assertion is false (that is, some prisoners still haven't been to the living room), all 100 prisoners will be shot for their stupidity. However, if it is indeed true, all prisoners are set free and inducted into MENSA, since the world can always use more smart people. Thus, the assertion should only be made if the prisoner is 100% certain of its validity.  Before this whole procedure begins, the prisoners are allowed to get together in the courtyard to discuss a plan. What is the optimal plan they can agree on, so that eventually, someone will make a correct assertion?    I was wondering does anyone know the solution for the 4,000 days solution. Also, anyone got any ideas on how to solve this?   Just wanted to know if anyone got any ideas how to solve this.  is offering prize money for a proof of a optimal solution for it. I suppose to make it clear the people want a plan that would mean on average it would take least amount of time to free the prisoner. The point is the average run time is as low as possible.
61105
The usual (Christian) justification for suffering/evil in the world created by a benevolent God is freedom of the will. However, the more interesting question is not about the source of evil (which the free will may very well be) but why God chose to create the world such as it is. Why not create a world with freedom of the will, but without suffering? Even assuming that God is bound by logic such combination doesn't seem to be logically impossible: creatures certainly can do good of their own free will. There are two alternatives.  1) God is powerful enough for all practical intents and purposes, enough to be called God, but not omnipotent. He created only the best of all possible worlds (Leibniz). This position is perhaps the most defensible philosophically, it also avoids logical problems with , etc., but it does diminish deity's status and invites unpleasant questions like what limits God (logic only, inert matter, outer chaos, other beings), is there someone/thing more powerful, etc.    Interestingly enough, the original Christian theodicy wasn't free will. St.Augustine says poetically "the canvas of creation requires both the black and the white paint". "Requires" here can be interpreted differently,  is to explain the black by the "just punishment" for the original sin, which brings us to Adam and Eve, and back to the free will. But if God is still omnipotent and hence omniscient creating creatures he knew would sin, and then punishing them for it is hardly an improvement.   2) However, Augustine can be read more straightforwardly. Evil is "required" for the perfection of the world just like black paint is required for the perfection of a painting (evil can be interpreted as lack of good rather than something onto itself but that is beside the point). God is immoral, and he is beyond our conception of morality, his notion of perfection is his own. This is much bolder, and similar to Plotinus's position on the existence of the One, the One can not exist because it is "prior to all existence". But it does evoke the unpleasant taste of "ends justify the means". It is one thing to use "God is beyond our logic and comprehension" to get rid of unliftable stones, it is quite another to convince people to worship an immoral perfectionist.  Formally, there is another logical possibility of asserting both morality and omnipotence, but defending the morality of creating a world full of suffering, for a higher purpose perhaps. For example, the suffering only appears bad to us, not to an absolute being in its wisdom. But this simply redefines morality and is only different in phraseology from the Augustine's position. The question is asked in human terms and has to be answered in kind. One is free to argue that God is beyond human logic and/or morality, but it still leaves him immoral as commonly understood.   There does not appear to be a way to square this circle, one has to accept Leibniz's or Augustine's alternative (or both) and deal with the downsides. Option 2) looks more consistent, but it is rarely embraced, at least not openly. Perhaps, for "public relations" reasons it is more attractive to dismiss the question with something like "this is beyond us" or change the subject to the free will.      What are the modern theological positions on the morality/omnipotence in catholisism, protestantism, etc.? Is the question relevant to other religions?   EDIT: I am not sure that it came through but by immoral I did not mean morally deficient or evil. Rather at the God's plane of being morality becomes meaningless, like tastes or smells are meaningless when applied to elementary particles.
112260
In the following link () the authors are basically arguing that there are statements that we cannot deny without contradicting ourselves. Is it possible to prove that?   The initial reason that led me to ask this question is the following: Let us suppose someone asks you if you think it is possible for you to know something. If you reply "no", you contradict yourself. Is it possible to prove that it is impossible to deny such a statement without contradicting yourself? If not, what does it mean for the statement itself? Do we just suppose the statement is true until we find an example that falsifies it?
117300
Theory isn't the right word because my "theory" is nothing but an idea that works for me that would take forever to explain. Actually, explaining my "theory" is exactly why I need the word :) Since the subject is creation, I don't want to call my "theory" that word because it's completely non-scientific, hardly salt to the Theory of Evolution's pepper.  Belief isn't the right word either. Again, my thing doesn't rise to that level. I believe in global warming, evolution, apple pie and that Jon Snow will live until (maybe even THROUGH) the end! I don't believe in God in any sense that I've ever heard preached or that I've read. Faith doesn't work either. The word "faith" fits better to the Jon Snow reference above.  My degree of certainty that my "theory" is correct is kind of nil. I guess I can describe it as something my scientific psyche can accept and that makes me feel warm and fuzzy. I'd like to think my thingy is right.  So, what can I call it?
18067
I came across  and at the time there were no suggested answers. After reading Mark Hubbart's comment (at the time with four upvotes), which was the correct answer, and seeing that it had been over 30 minutes since his comment, I figured I would provide that answer in my own words, which I did. My answer is longer, and I think more rounded and more useful, but the core of the answer came from the comment. I have no idea if I'd have thought up the answer on my own--a definite maybe to that.  Now had I tried to be "honorable" or something, such as instead of answering, suggesting to the commenter that he make his comment an answer, I would only have accomplished giving away easy rep to some other user not as into gratuitous self-denial.  The commenter had merely to enter his comment into an answer box instead of a comment box! It was his choice! Whether he was too lazy or didn't think his answer worthwhile or some other reason is not my responsibility. Must I bend over backward to help him earn points that he so carelessly left lying around for another person to take? It just took a tiny bit of non-laziness on my part to get my text typed into the box that would reward me instead of the box that wouldn't.  If my perspective is incorrect and the community would rather see such answers-as-comments rewarded and supported, I will gladly accept that. In the meantime, I just want to shake off the tiny bit of guilt my overly-nice and overly-concerned-with-propriety self is feeling. :)
65570
I would like to hear some philosophical arguments which justify the use of logic.   Additionally, if a justification of logic takes the form of an inference, is it a problem if this inference itself makes use of logic.   Can we justify logic in a way that is not circular? Is a circular justification a bad thing?  Thanks.
49596
Suppose the following dialogue:  ... &quot;I accept only one notion of land property. Namely, 'I am doing my stuff here, therefore I am here&quot;. &quot;But this means,&quot; he responded, &quot;you can break into any place and stay there, using this rule.&quot; &quot;There is another rule, though. Right to act in its most natural sense, 'I am here, therefore I am doing my stuff here.&quot; &quot;But do not these rules put together become circular reasoning?&quot; &quot;Of course, they do,&quot; I put my head closer to him, &quot;and this is exactly that rare case when circular reasoning is not only sufficient, but is necessary.&quot; &quot;But why is that? Circular reasoning never was a correct argument.&quot; &quot;There are many circular things happening in nature. Life forms, for example, exist only in order to produce new life forms or to prolongate their own lifetime. Is there any reason to say this can't be the case for reason itself? Why must reasoning not be circular?&quot; ...  Can circular reasoning ever be justified? For example, we know all the words in our languages can't be defined using other words without the use of circularity. We know logic can't prove itself without circularity. Are these arguments rational? Are there any other arguments where circular reasoning is still rational?
48573
makes fun of a frequentist statistician who derives an obviously wrong result.  However it seems to me that his reasoning is actually correct in the sense that it follows  the standard frequentist methodology.   So my question is "does he correctly apply the frequentist methodology?"    If no: what would be a correct frequentist inference in this scenario? How to integrate "prior knowledge" about the sun stability in the frequentist methodology? If yes: wtf? ;-)
59249
This is what is supposedly his claim:     My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore   is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with   which our understanding constructs experience.   How can he say that if a noumenal self has to exist in nature and be bound to body that exists in nature? Also, if his noumenal self is free then so does 7 billion other people's, which is not the case because they all live in a societal structure where everyone has freedom that comes with a bunch conditions as to what is forbidden.
87631
Some spells like  and  specify that only an unwilling creature makes a saving throw:     If the target is unwilling, it can make a Constitution saving throw.    and     An unwilling creature must make a Wisdom saving throw to avoid the effect.   ... but is an unconscious character able to make this judgment (and therefore be eligible to make a saving throw)?  Mind you, I've seen  on opting in to certain spells, but I'm specifically asking about opting out so as to be eligible for the saving throws.
28150
I know this is hard to answer since, to the extent that anyone does this, they likely don't do it consciously. In the spirit of Richard Wiseman and  I just wondered what were people's thoughts on it.  Please bear in mind that that's me in the picture, and if you down-vote this, that'll be a real person hurtin', not some abstract symbol.
12354
This is not originally my question but someone deleted their question while I was typing an answer to it. Consequently, I'm reposting the question and then my answer -- n.b., I've changed the title slightly to correct for what I'm guessing he deleted the question for.    I'm studying existentialism at the moment and Sartre's explanation of existentialist ethics is as follows:     Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.   And     Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole.   (Existentialism and Humanism).   This sounds similar to Kant's categorical imperative - the idea that when making a decision, we should imagine making a universal law for all of mankind.  So, is this Sartre borrowing from Kant?