Logically, if the only proof of existence we have is what we can see, hear, smell, touch, taste, and feel the movement of, why do many philosophies deal with issues outside the physical? Due to these scientific limitations of not being able to prove anything nonphysical (not limited to entities/ concepts surrounding spirituality and religion[s]) exists in any concrete way that affects our daily lives in ways that WE OURSELVES don't choose it to, why doesn't philosophy eliminate these concepts?
123489
Nonphysical entities cannot be observed. Therefore such entities cannot be verified by observation. How could statements like "God exists" be even considered true? Why would anyone appeal to the metaphysical realm at all?  It seems to me that the best method by which we should go about in understanding the world is by initially ruling out the possibility of the metaphysical altogether for the simplest answer (a sort of null hypothesis). Once we can get a hold of a natural cause of some phenomenon, we should be satisfied that that is all there is to it. Formulating some nonphysical cause would be unnecessary, superfluously complicated, or even cluttered. Now if there was some problem that we were certain could not be solved by observation or experimentation or whose solution could not possibly exist in the observable realm, yet must be true, I would consider the possibility of a metaphysical cause.      That said, I don't think that if you can't empirically observe something, it doesn't exist; rather, I would declare total agnosticism and say that it is unknowable.
60657
What is a comprehensive definition of Philosophy? Alternatively, is it impossible to define Philosophy? This is a pseudo- question, but it seems like it belongs here.
97359
What is the advantage of accepting the axiom of choice over other axioms (for e.g. axiom of determinacy)?  It seems that there is no clear reason to prefer over other axioms..  Thanks for help.
120761
I've recently come across several statements to the effect "there are questions science can't answer", mostly from proponents of  and , but also from  and  as well.   However it seemed to me that there was an inherent contradiction in statements of the type "Science doesn't have all the answers" or "Science can't answer all questions". This is hinged on what is meant by "answering a question". It seems to me that to answer any significant question is to provide 2 things:    An accurate and objective explanation of the current state of affairs, in terms of relationships, causes and effects.  Based on that explanation, a method for making decisions if one is faced with future scenarios similar to or related to the current state of affairs, and for predicting future states of affairs with a certain amount probability, i.e the explanation is useful for future purposes.   But then if a field of inquiry is able to provide accurate, objective and useful information regarding a question, doesn't that field simply become part of science?   As examples:    If some school of mysticism is demonstrated to truly improve the happiness and well being of it's practitioners, then wouldn't that school's mystical teachings simply be incorporated into mainstream psychology and psychotherapy?  Similarly, if a political ideology is proven to provide better economic conditions and less crime, less pollution, etc...then this ideology's principles would become an accepted part of social sciences?     To put it more simply: Science has all the answers, because science IS anything that can provide objective and useful answers to a question.  Am I not talking about the demarcation problem per-se (at I least I think I am not), because even disciplines which are agreed upon as failing various demarcation criteria (such as astrology or intelligent design) are still trying (and failing) to be scientific in the sense I mentioned above. If they did start to provide answers, science would have to take them into account. Moreover, various philosophical schools of ethics are trying to be scientific in their explanatory framework, they are just not able to provide verifiable and falsifiable statements to prove their precepts (and probably would do so if possible).   My questions then are:    Per those who claim that science can't answer all questions, what type of question are they talking about? Do they have a demarcation criteria for such questions? (I'm not asking for examples, there are already plenty in the links I posted above).  If a field starts providing objective, accurate answers, doesn't it just become a subfield of science?   Is there a second demarcation problem between "carckpot" pseudosciences (such as astrology or numerology) which are providing the wrong answers and legitimate fields of inquiry (such as political theory or ethics) which are trying to provide answers but so far have failed to provide verifiable and falsifiable statements or accurate predictions?
96596
I know that we can prove a contradiction in naive set theory.  Let D be a set of all sets that don't contain itself. Say D does not contain D. Then D contains D. That means D contains itself. A contradiction. Hence, D contains D. But that means D doesn't contain itself. That means D doesn't contain D again. But we presume D contains D. So another contradiction. Because either D contains itself and D does not contain itself is false, we're pretty much stuck.  So, set theory is pretty much upgraded to kingdom come to prevent this so called contradiction. I am still unsure how after so much upgrade the contradiction is gone.  How do we know that there will be no contradiction for group or other theory? How do I know if that from some axioms like commutative, associative, have identity, etc. suddenly I found out that A is a group and not a group or something like that.  Note: The problem with one contradiction is if you can proof one you can proof anything. Say I want to proof 1=0. Say 1 is not 0. Now, let Z be a set of all sets that doesn't contain it self. Yada yada yada... Contradiction. Hence, 1=0. The sun also rises in the west (at least for the last 300 years)
30978
In , John Loftus often makes statements like:  Faith, as I argue, is an irrational leap over the probabilities. Probabilities about such a matter are all that matter. We should think exclusively in terms of them. (19) If God created us as reasonable people, then the correct religious faith should have sufficient evidence for it, since that’s what reasonable people require. (22) Because science is the only game in town. It works. It produces the goods. There isn’t a better alternative. (119)  Loftus' attitude seems representative among many atheists; while I'm aware that there are other views, it is this kind of view which leads to the title of this question: Ought we only form beliefs based on sufficient empirical evidence? Here are some sub-questions which may help guide answers:  How can we get an ought from an is, given that evidence only describes what is? Reformulating the title as a hypothetical imperative doesn't seem to help, because the scientific method doesn't seem to ever make a hypothetical imperative binding. And yet, surely those who would agree with the quoted text would find certain hypothetical imperatives binding?  Given that the scientific method includes &quot;basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability&quot;,  seems to apply: a given axiomatic formulation of the scientific method will be unable to imply certain (virtually all, it turns out) truths. To say that science is complete—there are no other methods of knowing things—seems to imply that science is inconsistent. Is this 'seems' an illusion?  Does the scientific method require that we make observations prior to forming hypotheses? It could be argued that probabilistically, trying to come up with hypotheses before making a 'sufficient' number of observations will result in a failed hypothesis too much of the time. Is there evidence to support this which can probabilistically rule out all other kinds of hypothesis-forming?  Must we accept any unfalsifiable claims? The answer seems to be 'yes', given e.g. the example of crystal structure discussed by Michael Polanyi in  (43-48, 1984 paperback). A set of geometries seemed to well-describe many crystals found in nature, and even if some crystals aren't well-described, that doesn't falsify the instances in which it does. This opens up the question of which unfalsifiable claims we ought to accept.  If we model human reasoning as , we can ask what is meant by 'sufficient' by what the 'probabilities' are, prior to any observations: what  ought we start with? I am tempted to say &quot;the most effective one&quot;, but that presupposes a purpose; are we given an objective purpose?   I am left with the suspicion that one ought to only follow the scientific method to the extent that one only wants to predict one's future observations—this smells like a tautology. It seems to beg the question to say that the most important area of 'truth' is objective reality, a question which cannot be answered with the scientific method. A 'yes' answer to the main question would seem to fall prey to something like  of .  I was tempted to phrase my question as:  Is science the only source of truth?  I believe this is a bad question, for a few reasons:  We care about whether a method can reliably arrive at truth/knowledge. The terms 'truth' and 'knowledge' would possibly stir a debate about , which may not be a prerequisite for the answer to my question. My question makes explicit that we are talking about what one ought to do, which is not explicit in the above formulation.
15739
Some time ago, I read something like this about the issue of &quot;a final theory&quot; in Physics: &quot;Concerning the physical laws, we have several positions as scientists  There are no fundamental physical laws. At the most elementary level, the Universe/Multiverse is essentially chaotic and anarchical. There are no such laws.  There are a continuous sequence of more and more precise theories, but there is no a final theory. Physics will be always evolving from one approximate theory to another bigger and more accurate. In the end, we will be also able to find a better theory and additional levels of complexity or reality.  There is a final theory explaining everything, and we will find if and only if: i) We are clever enough to find such a theory. ii) We make good and sophisticated enough mathematics. iii) We guess the right axioms/principles/ideas. iv) We interpretate data correctly and test the putative final theory with suitable instruments/experiments. &quot;   Supposing 3) is the right approach... Question: How could we prove the mere mathematical existence of such a theory? Wouldn't it evade the Gödel's incompleteness theorem somehow since, as a Theory of Everything, it would be explain &quot;all&quot; and though it should be mathematically self-consistent? How could a Theory of Everything be a counterexample of Gödel's theorem if it is so, or not? Note: The alledged unification of couplings in supersymmetric theories is a hint of &quot;unification&quot; of forces, but I am not sure if it counts as sufficient condition to the existence of a final theory. Complementary: Is it true that Hawking has changed his view about this question? SUMMARY: 1') Does a final theory of physics exist? The issue of existence should be tied to some of its remarkable properties (likely). 2') How could we prove its existence or disproof it and hence prove that the only path in Physics is an infinite sequence of more and more precise theories or that the Polyverse is random and/or chaotic at the most fundamental level? 3') How 1') and 2') affect to Gödel's theorems? I have always believed, since Physmatics=Physics+Mathematics (E.Zaslow, Clay Institute) is larger than the mere sum that the challenge of the final theory should likely offer so hint about how to &quot;evade&quot; some of the Gödel's theorems. Of course, this last idea is highly controversial and speculative at this point.
63697
When I study Topology, I met with a problem. On my book, it says 'we cannot admit that there exists a set whose members are all the topological spaces. That will lead to a logical contradiction, that there will be a set who is a member of itself.' But why we cannot have a set who is a member of itself?
97298
I'm sure everyone is familiar with the Ship of Theseus paradox, basically "If you replace parts of a ship over time until none of the original ship is left, is the end product still the same ship?"  I just read pop philosophy books, so spare me if this is an idiotic question, but could this be applied to the Brain and consciousness? If you were the take individual atoms/neurons, and somehow replace them with its exact copy one at a time, how would the person experience that?   I don't think there would be an interruption of consciousness, but at the end it's a completely separate (but identical) brain from the one you started with. Exactly as if you had just cloned the whole thing, right? But without interruption.  What interests me is the gradual transition of consciousness here, is it possible to know how that would  work?  I think I remember hearing people argue similarly for both the existence of a transcendent soul and also AI consciousness. And the only other discussion I found of this was on a flat earth forum, so I don't know what to make of that.   I hope I articulated my question clearly. Thank you!
63642
Is there a substance that doesn't reflect or absorb visible light but may reflect light from another spectrum? Is there a theoretical substance that would have these properties?  EDIT: Sorry I wasn't quite clear with my original question. I've updated it to express more what I was thinking. Would a substance be "invisible" if it didn't reflect or absorb light? Does a real or theoretical substance like that exist? I assume we can see glass and so on because it refracts light and to a certain extent reflects it.
15976
For a proposition, such as:     P: Socrates is a man   Then not P is also a proposition:     Not P: Socrates is not a man   But do the same goes for properties? One can argue in the following way:    red is a property of red flags, or of red apples; but not red is not a property; for no thing instantiates not redness; that is not redness does not cohere in some substrate - here a flag, or apple; even though whiteness, which is an example of not redness, coheres in a white wall.  Q. Is this right?  All this, I think, takes it for granted that properties cohere in some substrate or substance - this is a commitment to a specific ontology; we may choose something else; the obvious choice being a world where all that there is are bundles of properties, and no substrate or substance to which to hang them on; there, existence is also a property - a property which all existing entities have.   Q. Given this ontological commitment; then is not P also a property?
49174
So, I am wondering if anyone could help me with the notions of grounding (supervenience?) and  emergence in the modern discussions in philosophy of science. What are they and what is the relation between them? Any papers or simply thoughts?
82737
I am not questioning whether the simulation topic is outside science. I am asking what evidence there is or could be to resolve whether we are or not.   Living in a simulation has been a topic for philosophy since at least Descartes, with his 'evil demon not less powerful than deceitful'. Zuangzhi's 'Now I do not know whether I was then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, dreaming I am a man' could be argued to be a statement of the same idea. What I am interested in is, is can we get beyond speculation and make headway on this? How does the evidence stand, what tools do we have, and what implications might the different answers have?  Here I quickly summarize some of the main positions:    (2003), Nick Bostrom, makes the case we are in a simulation, on the balance of probabilities   (2017), Ringel &amp; Kovrizhin, makes the case such a simulation is impossible using classical computers.  But that leaves quantum computers.  (2014) gives a more detailed idea of what being in a simulation might mean, as a kind of peer-to-peer reality  demonstrates a serious argument that the simulation hypothesis is the best answer to the Fermi Paradox.  Although as recently discussed on here, the existence of this paradox is open to dispute, and relies on a range of assumptions.   Anyone got anything else evidence based? Any models, or discussions of implications?
6091
Socrates continually admonished his interlocutors to become more introspective, arguing passionately for self-examination:     The unexamined life is not worth living.   But an examined life is painful, and necessitates an involvement with real problems. This is why it's worth living -- the unreflective are easily trapped into a living death of the mind by mythology, as the reflective sometimes are by ideology. In both cares we are deadened, sleepwalking through our lives blind and deaf, incapable of interacting with the world as it actually is much less imagining the world as it should be.  Now, we know of course that Socrates did not refrain from commenting on the generally unreflective character of his fellow Athenians. This is really the heart of my question. Certain reactionary critics might suggest that it's all well and good to closely examine one's own beliefs and values, but why should you go about examining the beliefs and values of others?
108426
I am confused about this question. It may have a simple answer of which I have overlooked.  Can something be nothing?  Because I believe nothing must be something, like a fact or idea of no thing existing. Yet even though nothing is something, something is something in itself, and therefore can not be nothing.  This could also apply to "Can something be anything (or everything)?".
34301
My understanding of logic is really basic, and I ask this question out of curiosity.  Is there an explicit example of a statement whose proof uses the continuum hypothesis and is unprovable in $ZFC + \lnot CH$.   ADDED: Preferably I'm looking for an example outside set theory.
56882
The belief that everything is relative is obviously self-refuting, because it holds to an absolute.  However, in my experience, people who believe this (or some form of it) such as some Buddhists and atheistic materialists, or people who have an even more radical belief that permits no knowledge at all, such as nihilists, still actively resist those who suggest that there are at least some absolutes. In their discussing what reality is like and whether one idea corresponds to reality better than another idea, aren't they admitting that reality itself is an absolute and that at least one thing is absolutely knowable (a way in which reality is or is not, to which certain ideas correspond more or less closely)?  To put it another way, this very desire to show others that "some-absolute-truths-exist" is wrong seems to destroy their own "all is relative" or "nothing is knowable" positions. By taking a stance against any truth claim at all, they are making an ontological claim about what reality is not like and that this should apply globally—thus making a truth claim, admitting to at least one absolute. That seems ridiculously inconsistent, like someone going around and yelling at random passersby, "I'm not yelling at you!" and "You can't hear me yelling!"  I think that someone who believes in absolutely comprehensive global relativism (to me an impossible bit of nonsense, like square circles) has no business arguing with anyone at all. Any discussion they engage in cannot be intended to find truth together with their discussion partners, because they're either insane, lying, or the discussion was undertaken solely for their own pleasure—why else would someone who doesn't believe anything is true argue with you about whether something you think is true actually is? And pleasuring oneself in public at the expense of other people's comfort and in violation of basic human propriety (I don't know how to put this more delicately, it honestly seems like a very apt analogy) seems like a pretty reprehensible thing to do.  What kind of basis do relativists and their more extreme nihilist friends have for arguing against anything at all? And why do they seem to never, ever admit that when they do argue with others about the truth of any claim, that this is mistreatment solely in pursuit of their own offensive pleasure and amusement (since it can't be an attempt to discover truth, and their argument with the other person can't be an attempt to discredit an incorrect idea, since neither correct nor incorrect ideas exist)?