finished_summaries/gradesaver/The Consolation of Philosophy/section_1_part_0.txt
The Consolation of Philosophy.book ii
book ii
{"name": "Book II", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20201128165942/https://www.gradesaver.com/the-consolation-of-philosophy/study-guide/summary-book-ii", "summary": "At the beginning of Book II, Lady Philosophy has grown silent. She has become quiet so that Boethius, in his weakened spiritual state, entreats her to speak. She says that she has fully diagnosed the cause and nature of his condition, and will prepare the \"persuasive powers of sweet-tongued rhetoric,\" a power often abused by those who do not properly understand Philosophy, to gently heal him of his illness. Again, she reiterates that Boethius is pining away for his former good fortune, and the loss of which has corrupted his mind. She says that Boethius has been seduced by Fortune , and that in her many guises she has lured other people to their undoing, too. Again, Philosophy describes the capricious nature of Fortune, pointing out how the workings of Fortune are not to be considered tragic when they cause reversals for her former beneficiaries. Fortune's \"gifts\" are really loans, Philosophy reminds Boethius, and to return something that was only lent to you is not a loss and not something about which to grieve. Philosophy also implies that, while Boethius enjoyed Fortune's favors, he must have known that her gifts were not very important anyway. Boethius is reminded not only that he came into this world with none of Fortune's gifts, and he should never have become so attached to any of them that he could not lose them without grief. While Boethius acknowledges the logic of Philosophy's argument, he is not yet in a fit state to receive comfort from it. Here Philosophy reminds Boethius, somewhat to his pain so she does not dwell on it, that he was in this earthly life the luckiest of men. Though orphaned, he was adopted into the home of a very aristocratic and well-respected man, and he married into that same family. He has been blessed not only with a worthy and modest wife, but also two good sons. And he had the privilege of seeing those sons raised to the office of consul together. Boethius then complains that the worst part of this is the memory of his past good fortune. \"In all adversity of fortune, the most wretched kind is once to have been happy.\" Philosophy counters that the most precious gift from Fortune, Boethius's family, still exists unharmed. Compared to many, Fortune says, Boethius is still a very fortunate man. A debate ensues on the way happiness can be attained by a human being, for, it seems, even if a person has all the gifts of fortune, there is still anxiety and disquiet in his or her heart. Philosophy says that human happiness is impossible to achieve in earthly life. Happiness is not found in the temporal gifts of Fortune - not even in those most precious gifts of family. The discussion continues onto the nature of \"good\" in the things that the world considers \"good fortune,\" which are wealth, material possessions, power, and honor. Each of these things is said by Philosophy to be incapable of bestowing true happiness. Wealth is only of value when being transferred, and such has no value in itself. In addition, any acquisition of wealth is the taking away of wealth from someone else. The power of wealth is not something that is your own, but rather a function of that wealth, so then how can it make you happy? Honor and power can be bestowed upon you by someone who is not a fair judge of either, so these are not the path to happiness either. The beauty of Nature, too, is incapable of giving true happiness because we cannot take credit for Nature. It is entirely the construction of God, and therefore we can only admire it but cannot claim it for our own. If one desires fancy clothing, or a long line of servants, the good of either cannot be truly owned by the possessor, so they are not the path to happiness either. \"From all this it is obvious that not one of those things which you count among your blessings is in fact any blessing of yours at all.\" Philosophy says. The only things which a person may truly possess are the blessings of his or her own intellectual inquiry and soul. Since these are internal blessings, it is argued, they can never be taken away, and are wholly owned by the thinker. God, Philosophy says, made human beings to rule the Earth, but not to attempt to adorn themselves with inferior things. God has given humankind an intellect by which to inquire into philosophical things, not to concern themselves with goods which can only be inferior to the worth of their own minds. Add to this that the human soul is immortal, and cannot and never will be satisfied by a temporal happiness from earthly things, which would only last until the death of the body. Boethius counters that he never wanted any of the temporal blessings for his own sake. He is not an ambitious man, but only entered public life out of a sense of duty. But Lady Philosophy reminds Boethius that he did enjoy his honors, and, while they were well-deserved, it is important that everyone remembers that the gifts of Fortune are inconstant and can be easily taken away. After death, the soul will look back on what was so important in life and consider it to be insignificant. In this life, it is probably better for the soul to have bad fortune, for that does not enslave the soul as much as good fortune does. Philosophy relents slightly from her strict censure of Fortune's gifts near the end of Book II, when she says that bad fortune gives another great gift; the knowledge of one's true friends, the ones who truly love you. This wisdom, she says, could not be bought for any price while one had good fortune. She ends the book with a hymn about how love binds the earth together.", "analysis": "The beginning of Book II contains a subtle hint to the reader that Boethius was a spiritual and philosophical man before his honors and possessions were taken away by imprisonment.  When Philosophy says that Boethius, in the favors of Fortune, had \"nothing much of value\" it is clear that Boethius has always had, or at least affected to have, a disdain for worldly things.  A man who was born into a patrician family, with a famous name and extraordinary powers of intellect, who never wanted for money, and experienced royal favor and advancement for much of his life may well have had disdain for worldly possessions, honors, and achievements.  This passage seems a little naA-ve unless considered within the context of Christianity.  If Boethius were still a pagan Roman, the gifts of the goddess Fortuna would have been things to pray for, and, if received, things for which he would have given praise to the gods.  But the teachings of Catholic Christianity were such that none of the gifts of Fortune  were to be valued as much as the love of God and spiritual enlightenment.  Boethius is espousing a wholly Christian position here, couched in the language of philosophy. The psychological progression of Boethius here is plain to see.  He slowly allows his emotions to quieten, letting himself rest while he turns his thoughts back to the logic of Philosophy's argument.  His sorrow is still acute and not assuaged, but he thinks he has possibly found the way to convince himself that his lot is not so bad.  Boethius, throughout his life, was very interested in logic, and wrote several books on the subject.  He believed wholeheartedly in its powers, and The Consolation of Philosophy can be viewed as a logical justification for much of Christian doctrine. The enshrinement of Symmachus, Boethius's father-in-law, and Boethius's wife, Rusticiana, as paragons of moral purity seem to give comfort to Boethius.  Again, it is argued, however, that true happiness cannot be found in the temporal gifts of Fortune, not even in the love of one's family.  While this idea is not necessarily one that would be agreed upon by modern psychology, it is essential to Christian belief.  It is also indicative of the times in which Boethius lived.  Not only could family  be taken off quickly by disease or accident, but the uncertain political climate of Rome governed by the barbarian emperors also meant that the lives of one's family and friends were by no means assured.  Placing total faith in and hanging one's happiness on one's loved ones was an easy way, Philosophy argues, to become quickly unhappy. The middle and end of Book II is one of Boethius's most powerful passages.  He begins with his complaint that to have been happy and then be disgraced is more sorrowful than having never been happy.  Boethius, though perhaps feeling this emotion sharply in his miserable imprisonment, surely knows the fallacy of this argument before he begins it.  Philosophy sharply reminds him that one of the most precious gifts of Fortune, his family, is still intact, and therefore he should be happier than many men.  Philosophy explains that he has lost nothing that he ever truly had, and she then enlightens Boethius on the \"good\" in earthly good things that was never truly good, because it was never truly possessed.  Philosophy argues that even pleasures that seem obvious, such as the pleasure of having many servants to do our hard work, are not necessarily \"good\" - after all, when our servants do wrong we are responsible, but when they do right we cannot claim credit. This points to Philosophy's essential argument: a person cannot claim credit for the \"good\" he or she experiences in earthly life.  This \"good\" depends on Fortune and not on human effort.  Only attainment of philosophical wisdom in the mind can truly be called one's own. This argument may or may not convince many readers, but it is sound in many respects.  It explains, especially in regard to wealth, the momentary satisfaction but enduring emptiness many people feel upon attaining certain goals of wealth or material possessions.  Near the end of Book II Philosophy explains that most people mistake the \"good\" of inferior things  for the true good: the good eternal things of the soul.  It is a standard religious tenet of more than one faith, but the way Boethius couches it in terms of ownership is compelling. He particularly shines in his explanation of how most people attempt to adorn themselves with exterior, inferior \"goods\"  while they neglect the greatest and only real good that they possess: their minds made in the image of their Creator.  When human beings recognize their own nature as being Godlike, rather than earthly, that is when they \"tower above the rest of creation.\"  All other goods, separate from the mind and the soul, are merely \"decoration\" that denigrates what it is decorating, because it does not belong to it.  Some readers may find the argument about ownership to be too callous, and perhaps the rejection of Nature as a source of happiness is skewed, but the overall construction of the chapter is a convincing argument for spirituality. Some of this argument is based on Neo-Platonist principles of substance and belonging, which don't directly affect the argument but inform some of Boethius' language.  Boethius tosses out phrases such as \"If every good is agreed to be more valuable than whatever it belongs to\" as if the reader, schooled in philosophy, would not dispute these statements or require explanation.  Nevertheless, Book II is intense, convincing, and contains eight beautiful poems which explicate the text."}
<CHAPTER>
BOOK II. I.


Thereafter for awhile she remained silent; and when she had restored my
flagging attention by a moderate pause in her discourse, she thus began:
'If I have thoroughly ascertained the character and causes of thy
sickness, thou art pining with regretful longing for thy former fortune.
It is the change, as thou deemest, of this fortune that hath so wrought
upon thy mind. Well do I understand that Siren's manifold wiles, the
fatal charm of the friendship she pretends for her victims, so long as
she is scheming to entrap them--how she unexpectedly abandons them and
leaves them overwhelmed with insupportable grief. Bethink thee of her
nature, character, and deserts, and thou wilt soon acknowledge that in
her thou hast neither possessed, nor hast thou lost, aught of any worth.
Methinks I need not spend much pains in bringing this to thy mind,
since, even when she was still with thee, even while she was caressing
thee, thou usedst to assail her in manly terms, to rebuke her, with
maxims drawn from my holy treasure-house. But all sudden changes of
circumstances bring inevitably a certain commotion of spirit. Thus it
hath come to pass that thou also for awhile hast been parted from thy
mind's tranquillity. But it is time for thee to take and drain a
draught, soft and pleasant to the taste, which, as it penetrates within,
may prepare the way for stronger potions. Wherefore I call to my aid the
sweet persuasiveness of Rhetoric, who then only walketh in the right way
when she forsakes not my instructions, and Music, my handmaid, I bid to
join with her singing, now in lighter, now in graver strain.

'What is it, then, poor mortal, that hath cast thee into lamentation and
mourning? Some strange, unwonted sight, methinks, have thine eyes seen.
Thou deemest Fortune to have changed towards thee; thou mistakest. Such
ever were her ways, ever such her nature. Rather in her very mutability
hath she preserved towards thee her true constancy. Such was she when
she loaded thee with caresses, when she deluded thee with the
allurements of a false happiness. Thou hast found out how changeful is
the face of the blind goddess. She who still veils herself from others
hath fully discovered to thee her whole character. If thou likest her,
take her as she is, and do not complain. If thou abhorrest her perfidy,
turn from her in disdain, renounce her, for baneful are her delusions.
The very thing which is now the cause of thy great grief ought to have
brought thee tranquillity. Thou hast been forsaken by one of whom no one
can be sure that she will not forsake him. Or dost thou indeed set value
on a happiness that is certain to depart? Again I ask, Is Fortune's
presence dear to thee if she cannot be trusted to stay, and though she
will bring sorrow when she is gone? Why, if she cannot be kept at
pleasure, and if her flight overwhelms with calamity, what is this
fleeting visitant but a token of coming trouble? Truly it is not enough
to look only at what lies before the eyes; wisdom gauges the issues of
things, and this same mutability, with its two aspects, makes the
threats of Fortune void of terror, and her caresses little to be
desired. Finally, thou oughtest to bear with whatever takes place within
the boundaries of Fortune's demesne, when thou hast placed thy head
beneath her yoke. But if thou wishest to impose a law of staying and
departing on her whom thou hast of thine own accord chosen for thy
mistress, art thou not acting wrongfully, art thou not embittering by
impatience a lot which thou canst not alter? Didst thou commit thy sails
to the winds, thou wouldst voyage not whither thy intention was to go,
but whither the winds drave thee; didst thou entrust thy seed to the
fields, thou wouldst set off the fruitful years against the barren. Thou
hast resigned thyself to the sway of Fortune; thou must submit to thy
mistress's caprices. What! art thou verily striving to stay the swing
of the revolving wheel? Oh, stupidest of mortals, if it takes to
standing still, it ceases to be the wheel of Fortune.'



SONG I. FORTUNE'S MALICE.


    Mad Fortune sweeps along in wanton pride,
    Uncertain as Euripus' surging tide;
    Now tramples mighty kings beneath her feet;
    Now sets the conquered in the victor's seat.
    She heedeth not the wail of hapless woe,
    But mocks the griefs that from her mischief flow.
    Such is her sport; so proveth she her power;
    And great the marvel, when in one brief hour
    She shows her darling lifted high in bliss,
    Then headlong plunged in misery's abyss.



II.


'Now I would fain also reason with thee a little in Fortune's own words.
Do thou observe whether her contentions be just. "Man," she might say,
"why dost thou pursue me with thy daily complainings? What wrong have I
done thee? What goods of thine have I taken from thee? Choose an thou
wilt a judge, and let us dispute before him concerning the rightful
ownership of wealth and rank. If thou succeedest in showing that any one
of these things is the true property of mortal man, I freely grant those
things to be thine which thou claimest. When nature brought thee forth
out of thy mother's womb, I took thee, naked and destitute as thou wast,
I cherished thee with my substance, and, in the partiality of my favour
for thee, I brought thee up somewhat too indulgently, and this it is
which now makes thee rebellious against me. I surrounded thee with a
royal abundance of all those things that are in my power. Now it is my
pleasure to draw back my hand. Thou hast reason to thank me for the use
of what was not thine own; thou hast no right to complain, as if thou
hadst lost what was wholly thine. Why, then, dost bemoan thyself? I have
done thee no violence. Wealth, honour, and all such things are placed
under my control. My handmaidens know their mistress; with me they come,
and at my going they depart. I might boldly affirm that if those things
the loss of which thou lamentest had been thine, thou couldst never have
lost them. Am I alone to be forbidden to do what I will with my own?
Unrebuked, the skies now reveal the brightness of day, now shroud the
daylight in the darkness of night; the year may now engarland the face
of the earth with flowers and fruits, now disfigure it with storms and
cold. The sea is permitted to invite with smooth and tranquil surface
to-day, to-morrow to roughen with wave and storm. Shall man's insatiate
greed bind _me_ to a constancy foreign to my character? This is my art,
this the game I never cease to play. I turn the wheel that spins. I
delight to see the high come down and the low ascend. Mount up, if thou
wilt, but only on condition that thou wilt not think it a hardship to
come down when the rules of my game require it. Wert thou ignorant of my
character? Didst not know how Croesus, King of the Lydians, erstwhile
the dreaded rival of Cyrus, was afterwards pitiably consigned to the
flame of the pyre, and only saved by a shower sent from heaven? Has it
'scaped thee how Paullus paid a meed of pious tears to the misfortunes
of King Perseus, his prisoner? What else do tragedies make such woeful
outcry over save the overthrow of kingdoms by the indiscriminate strokes
of Fortune? Didst thou not learn in thy childhood how there stand at the
threshold of Zeus 'two jars,' 'the one full of blessings, the other of
calamities'? How if thou hast drawn over-liberally from the good jar?
What if not even now have I departed wholly from thee? What if this very
mutability of mine is a just ground for hoping better things? But listen
now, and cease to let thy heart consume away with fretfulness, nor
expect to live on thine own terms in a realm that is common to all.'



SONG II. MAN'S COVETOUSNESS.


    What though Plenty pour her gifts
      With a lavish hand,
    Numberless as are the stars,
      Countless as the sand,
    Will the race of man, content,
    Cease to murmur and lament?

    Nay, though God, all-bounteous, give
      Gold at man's desire--
    Honours, rank, and fame--content
      Not a whit is nigher;
    But an all-devouring greed
    Yawns with ever-widening need.

    Then what bounds can e'er restrain
      This wild lust of having,
    When with each new bounty fed
      Grows the frantic craving?
    He is never rich whose fear
    Sees grim Want forever near.



III.


'If Fortune should plead thus against thee, assuredly thou wouldst not
have one word to offer in reply; or, if thou canst find any
justification of thy complainings, thou must show what it is. I will
give thee space to speak.'

Then said I: 'Verily, thy pleas are plausible--yea, steeped in the
honeyed sweetness of music and rhetoric. But their charm lasts only
while they are sounding in the ear; the sense of his misfortunes lies
deeper in the heart of the wretched. So, when the sound ceases to
vibrate upon the air, the heart's indwelling sorrow is felt with renewed
bitterness.'

Then said she: 'It is indeed as thou sayest, for we have not yet come to
the curing of thy sickness; as yet these are but lenitives conducing to
the treatment of a malady hitherto obstinate. The remedies which go deep
I will apply in due season. Nevertheless, to deprecate thy
determination to be thought wretched, I ask thee, Hast thou forgotten
the extent and bounds of thy felicity? I say nothing of how, when
orphaned and desolate, thou wast taken into the care of illustrious men;
how thou wast chosen for alliance with the highest in the state--and
even before thou wert bound to their house by marriage, wert already
dear to their love--which is the most precious of all ties. Did not all
pronounce thee most happy in the virtues of thy wife, the splendid
honours of her father, and the blessing of male issue? I pass over--for
I care not to speak of blessings in which others also have shared--the
distinctions often denied to age which thou enjoyedst in thy youth. I
choose rather to come to the unparalleled culmination of thy good
fortune. If the fruition of any earthly success has weight in the scale
of happiness, can the memory of that splendour be swept away by any
rising flood of troubles? That day when thou didst see thy two sons ride
forth from home joint consuls, followed by a train of senators, and
welcomed by the good-will of the people; when these two sat in curule
chairs in the Senate-house, and thou by thy panegyric on the king didst
earn the fame of eloquence and ability; when in the Circus, seated
between the two consuls, thou didst glut the multitude thronging around
with the triumphal largesses for which they looked--methinks thou didst
cozen Fortune while she caressed thee, and made thee her darling. Thou
didst bear off a boon which she had never before granted to any private
person. Art thou, then, minded to cast up a reckoning with Fortune? Now
for the first time she has turned a jealous glance upon thee. If thou
compare the extent and bounds of thy blessings and misfortunes, thou
canst not deny that thou art still fortunate. Or if thou esteem not
thyself favoured by Fortune in that thy then seeming prosperity hath
departed, deem not thyself wretched, since what thou now believest to be
calamitous passeth also. What! art thou but now come suddenly and a
stranger to the scene of this life? Thinkest thou there is any stability
in human affairs, when man himself vanishes away in the swift course of
time? It is true that there is little trust that the gifts of chance
will abide; yet the last day of life is in a manner the death of all
remaining Fortune. What difference, then, thinkest thou, is there,
whether thou leavest her by dying, or she leave thee by fleeing away?'



SONG III. ALL PASSES.


    When, in rosy chariot drawn,
    Phoebus 'gins to light the dawn,
    By his flaming beams assailed,
    Every glimmering star is paled.
    When the grove, by Zephyrs fed,
    With rose-blossom blushes red;--
    Doth rude Auster breathe thereon,
    Bare it stands, its glory gone.
    Smooth and tranquil lies the deep
    While the winds are hushed in sleep.
    Soon, when angry tempests lash,
    Wild and high the billows dash.
    Thus if Nature's changing face
    Holds not still a moment's space,
    Fleeting deem man's fortunes; deem
    Bliss as transient as a dream.
    One law only standeth fast:
    Things created may not last.



IV.


Then said I: 'True are thine admonishings, thou nurse of all excellence;
nor can I deny the wonder of my fortune's swift career. Yet it is this
which chafes me the more cruelly in the recalling. For truly in adverse
fortune the worst sting of misery is to _have been_ happy.'

'Well,' said she, 'if thou art paying the penalty of a mistaken belief,
thou canst not rightly impute the fault to circumstances. If it is the
felicity which Fortune gives that moves thee--mere name though it
be--come reckon up with me how rich thou art in the number and
weightiness of thy blessings. Then if, by the blessing of Providence,
thou hast still preserved unto thee safe and inviolate that which,
howsoever thou mightest reckon thy fortune, thou wouldst have thought
thy most precious possession, what right hast thou to talk of
ill-fortune whilst keeping all Fortune's better gifts? Yet Symmachus,
thy wife's father--a man whose splendid character does honour to the
human race--is safe and unharmed; and while he bewails thy wrongs, this
rare nature, in whom wisdom and virtue are so nobly blended, is himself
out of danger--a boon thou wouldst have been quick to purchase at the
price of life itself. Thy wife yet lives, with her gentle disposition,
her peerless modesty and virtue--this the epitome of all her graces,
that she is the true daughter of her sire--she lives, I say, and for thy
sake only preserves the breath of life, though she loathes it, and pines
away in grief and tears for thy absence, wherein, if in naught else, I
would allow some marring of thy felicity. What shall I say of thy sons
and their consular dignity--how in them, so far as may be in youths of
their age, the example of their father's and grandfather's character
shines out? Since, then, the chief care of mortal man is to preserve his
life, how happy art thou, couldst thou but recognise thy blessings, who
possessest even now what no one doubts to be dearer than life!
Wherefore, now dry thy tears. Fortune's hate hath not involved all thy
dear ones; the stress of the storm that has assailed thee is not beyond
measure intolerable, since there are anchors still holding firm which
suffer thee not to lack either consolation in the present or hope for
the future.'

'I pray that they still may hold. For while they still remain, however
things may go, I shall ride out the storm. Yet thou seest how much is
shorn of the splendour of my fortunes.'

'We are gaining a little ground,' said she, 'if there is something in
thy lot wherewith thou art not yet altogether discontented. But I cannot
stomach thy daintiness when thou complainest with such violence of grief
and anxiety because thy happiness falls short of completeness. Why, who
enjoys such settled felicity as not to have some quarrel with the
circumstances of his lot? A troublous matter are the conditions of human
bliss; either they are never realized in full, or never stay
permanently. One has abundant riches, but is shamed by his ignoble
birth. Another is conspicuous for his nobility, but through the
embarrassments of poverty would prefer to be obscure. A third, richly
endowed with both, laments the loneliness of an unwedded life. Another,
though happily married, is doomed to childlessness, and nurses his
wealth for a stranger to inherit. Yet another, blest with children,
mournfully bewails the misdeeds of son or daughter. Wherefore, it is not
easy for anyone to be at perfect peace with the circumstances of his
lot. There lurks in each several portion something which they who
experience it not know nothing of, but which makes the sufferer wince.
Besides, the more favoured a man is by Fortune, the more fastidiously
sensitive is he; and, unless all things answer to his whim, he is
overwhelmed by the most trifling misfortunes, because utterly unschooled
in adversity. So petty are the trifles which rob the most fortunate of
perfect happiness! How many are there, dost thou imagine, who would
think themselves nigh heaven, if but a small portion from the wreck of
thy fortune should fall to them? This very place which thou callest
exile is to them that dwell therein their native land. So true is it
that nothing is wretched, but thinking makes it so, and conversely every
lot is happy if borne with equanimity. Who is so blest by Fortune as not
to wish to change his state, if once he gives rein to a rebellious
spirit? With how many bitternesses is the sweetness of human felicity
blent! And even if that sweetness seem to him to bring delight in the
enjoying, yet he cannot keep it from departing when it will. How
manifestly wretched, then, is the bliss of earthly fortune, which lasts
not for ever with those whose temper is equable, and can give no perfect
satisfaction to the anxious-minded!

'Why, then, ye children of mortality, seek ye from without that
happiness whose seat is only within us? Error and ignorance bewilder
you. I will show thee, in brief, the hinge on which perfect happiness
turns. Is there anything more precious to thee than thyself? Nothing,
thou wilt say. If, then, thou art master of thyself, thou wilt possess
that which thou wilt never be willing to lose, and which Fortune cannot
take from thee. And that thou mayst see that happiness cannot possibly
consist in these things which are the sport of chance, reflect that, if
happiness is the highest good of a creature living in accordance with
reason, and if a thing which can in any wise be reft away is not the
highest good, since that which cannot be taken away is better than it,
it is plain that Fortune cannot aspire to bestow happiness by reason of
its instability. And, besides, a man borne along by this transitory
felicity must either know or not know its unstability. If he knows not,
how poor is a happiness which depends on the blindness of ignorance! If
he knows it, he needs must fear to lose a happiness whose loss he
believes to be possible. Wherefore, a never-ceasing fear suffers him not
to be happy. Or does he count the possibility of this loss a trifling
matter? Insignificant, then, must be the good whose loss can be borne so
equably. And, further, I know thee to be one settled in the belief that
the souls of men certainly die not with them, and convinced thereof by
numerous proofs; it is clear also that the felicity which Fortune
bestows is brought to an end with the death of the body: therefore, it
cannot be doubted but that, if happiness is conferred in this way, the
whole human race sinks into misery when death brings the close of all.
But if we know that many have sought the joy of happiness not through
death only, but also through pain and suffering, how can life make men
happy by its presence when it makes them not wretched by its loss?'



SONG IV. THE GOLDEN MEAN.


    Who founded firm and sure
    Would ever live secure,
    In spite of storm and blast
    Immovable and fast;
    Whoso would fain deride
    The ocean's threatening tide;--
    His dwelling should not seek
    On sands or mountain-peak.
    Upon the mountain's height
    The storm-winds wreak their spite:
    The shifting sands disdain
    Their burden to sustain.
    Do thou these perils flee,
    Fair though the prospect be,
    And fix thy resting-place
    On some low rock's sure base.
    Then, though the tempests roar,
    Seas thunder on the shore,
    Thou in thy stronghold blest
    And undisturbed shalt rest;
    Live all thy days serene,
    And mock the heavens' spleen.



V.


'But since my reasonings begin to work a soothing effect within thy
mind, methinks I may resort to remedies somewhat stronger. Come,
suppose, now, the gifts of Fortune were not fleeting and transitory,
what is there in them capable of ever becoming truly thine, or which
does not lose value when looked at steadily and fairly weighed in the
balance? Are riches, I pray thee, precious either through thy nature or
in their own? What are they but mere gold and heaps of money? Yet these
fine things show their quality better in the spending than in the
hoarding; for I suppose 'tis plain that greed Alva's makes men hateful,
while liberality brings fame. But that which is transferred to another
cannot remain in one's own possession; and if that be so, then money is
only precious when it is given away, and, by being transferred to
others, ceases to be one's own. Again, if all the money in the world
were heaped up in one man's possession, all others would be made poor.
Sound fills the ears of many at the same time without being broken into
parts, but your riches cannot pass to many without being lessened in the
process. And when this happens, they must needs impoverish those whom
they leave. How poor and cramped a thing, then, is riches, which more
than one cannot possess as an unbroken whole, which falls not to any one
man's lot without the impoverishment of everyone else! Or is it the
glitter of gems that allures the eye? Yet, how rarely excellent soever
may be their splendour, remember the flashing light is in the jewels,
not in the man. Indeed, I greatly marvel at men's admiration of them;
for what can rightly seem beautiful to a being endowed with life and
reason, if it lack the movement and structure of life? And although such
things do in the end take on them more beauty from their Maker's care
and their own brilliancy, still they in no wise merit your admiration
since their excellence is set at a lower grade than your own.

'Does the beauty of the fields delight you? Surely, yes; it is a
beautiful part of a right beautiful whole. Fitly indeed do we at times
enjoy the serene calm of the sea, admire the sky, the stars, the moon,
the sun. Yet is any of these thy concern? Dost thou venture to boast
thyself of the beauty of any one of them? Art _thou_ decked with
spring's flowers? is it _thy_ fertility that swelleth in the fruits of
autumn? Why art thou moved with empty transports? why embracest thou an
alien excellence as thine own? Never will fortune make thine that which
the nature of things has excluded from thy ownership. Doubtless the
fruits of the earth are given for the sustenance of living creatures.
But if thou art content to supply thy wants so far as suffices nature,
there is no need to resort to fortune's bounty. Nature is content with
few things, and with a very little of these. If thou art minded to force
superfluities upon her when she is satisfied, that which thou addest
will prove either unpleasant or harmful. But, now, thou thinkest it
fine to shine in raiment of divers colours; yet--if, indeed, there is
any pleasure in the sight of such things--it is the texture or the
artist's skill which I shall admire.

'Or perhaps it is a long train of servants that makes thee happy? Why,
if they behave viciously, they are a ruinous burden to thy house, and
exceeding dangerous to their own master; while if they are honest, how
canst thou count other men's virtue in the sum of thy possessions? From
all which 'tis plainly proved that not one of these things which thou
reckonest in the number of thy possessions is really thine. And if there
is in them no beauty to be desired, why shouldst thou either grieve for
their loss or find joy in their continued possession? While if they are
beautiful in their own nature, what is that to thee? They would have
been not less pleasing in themselves, though never included among thy
possessions. For they derive not their preciousness from being counted
in thy riches, but rather thou hast chosen to count them in thy riches
because they seemed to thee precious.

'Then, what seek ye by all this noisy outcry about fortune? To chase
away poverty, I ween, by means of abundance. And yet ye find the result
just contrary. Why, this varied array of precious furniture needs more
accessories for its protection; it is a true saying that they want most
who possess most, and, conversely, they want very little who measure
their abundance by nature's requirements, not by the superfluity of vain
display. Have ye no good of your own implanted within you, that ye seek
your good in things external and separate? Is the nature of things so
reversed that a creature divine by right of reason can in no other way
be splendid in his own eyes save by the possession of lifeless chattels?
Yet, while other things are content with their own, ye who in your
intellect are God-like seek from the lowest of things adornment for a
nature of supreme excellence, and perceive not how great a wrong ye do
your Maker. His will was that mankind should excel all things on earth.
Ye thrust down your worth beneath the lowest of things. For if that in
which each thing finds its good is plainly more precious than that whose
good it is, by your own estimation ye put yourselves below the vilest of
things, when ye deem these vile things to be your good: nor does this
fall out undeservedly. Indeed, man is so constituted that he then only
excels other things when he knows himself; but he is brought lower than
the beasts if he lose this self-knowledge. For that other creatures
should be ignorant of themselves is natural; in man it shows as a
defect. How extravagant, then, is this error of yours, in thinking that
anything can be embellished by adornments not its own. It cannot be. For
if such accessories add any lustre, it is the accessories that get the
praise, while that which they veil and cover remains in its pristine
ugliness. And again I say, That is no _good_, which injures its
possessor. Is this untrue? No, quite true, thou sayest. And yet riches
have often hurt those that possessed them, since the worst of men, who
are all the more covetous by reason of their wickedness, think none but
themselves worthy to possess all the gold and gems the world contains.
So thou, who now dreadest pike and sword, mightest have trolled a carol
"in the robber's face," hadst thou entered the road of life with empty
pockets. Oh, wondrous blessedness of perishable wealth, whose
acquisition robs thee of security!'



SONG V. THE FORMER AGE.


    Too blest the former age, their life
      Who in the fields contented led,
    And still, by luxury unspoiled,
      On frugal acorns sparely fed.

    No skill was theirs the luscious grape
      With honey's sweetness to confuse;
    Nor China's soft and sheeny silks
      T' empurple with brave Tyrian hues.

    The grass their wholesome couch, their drink
      The stream, their roof the pine's tall shade;
    Not theirs to cleave the deep, nor seek
      In strange far lands the spoils of trade.

    The trump of war was heard not yet,
      Nor soiled the fields by bloodshed's stain;
    For why should war's fierce madness arm
      When strife brought wound, but brought not gain?

    Ah! would our hearts might still return
      To following in those ancient ways.
    Alas! the greed of getting glows
      More fierce than Etna's fiery blaze.

    Woe, woe for him, whoe'er it was,
      Who first gold's hidden store revealed,
    And--perilous treasure-trove--dug out
      The gems that fain would be concealed!



VI.


'What now shall I say of rank and power, whereby, because ye know not
true power and dignity, ye hope to reach the sky? Yet, when rank and
power have fallen to the worst of men, did ever an Etna, belching forth
flame and fiery deluge, work such mischief? Verily, as I think, thou
dost remember how thine ancestors sought to abolish the consular power,
which had been the foundation of their liberties, on account of the
overweening pride of the consuls, and how for that self-same pride they
had already abolished the kingly title! And if, as happens but rarely,
these prerogatives are conferred on virtuous men, it is only the virtue
of those who exercise them that pleases. So it appears that honour
cometh not to virtue from rank, but to rank from virtue. Look, too, at
the nature of that power which ye find so attractive and glorious! Do ye
never consider, ye creatures of earth, what ye are, and over whom ye
exercise your fancied lordship? Suppose, now, that in the mouse tribe
there should rise up one claiming rights and powers for himself above
the rest, would ye not laugh consumedly? Yet if thou lookest to his body
alone, what creature canst thou find more feeble than man, who
oftentimes is killed by the bite of a fly, or by some insect creeping
into the inner passage of his system! Yet what rights can one exercise
over another, save only as regards the body, and that which is lower
than the body--I mean fortune? What! wilt thou bind with thy mandates
the free spirit? Canst thou force from its due tranquillity the mind
that is firmly composed by reason? A tyrant thought to drive a man of
free birth to reveal his accomplices in a conspiracy, but the prisoner
bit off his tongue and threw it into the furious tyrant's face; thus,
the tortures which the tyrant thought the instrument of his cruelty the
sage made an opportunity for heroism. Moreover, what is there that one
man can do to another which he himself may not have to undergo in his
turn? We are told that Busiris, who used to kill his guests, was himself
slain by his guest, Hercules. Regulus had thrown into bonds many of the
Carthaginians whom he had taken in war; soon after he himself submitted
his hands to the chains of the vanquished. Then, thinkest thou that man
hath any power who cannot prevent another's being able to do to him what
he himself can do to others?

'Besides, if there were any element of natural and proper good in rank
and power, they would never come to the utterly bad, since opposites are
not wont to be associated. Nature brooks not the union of contraries.
So, seeing there is no doubt that wicked wretches are oftentimes set in
high places, it is also clear that things which suffer association with
the worst of men cannot be good in their own nature. Indeed, this
judgment may with some reason be passed concerning all the gifts of
fortune which fall so plentifully to all the most wicked. This ought
also to be considered here, I think: No one doubts a man to be brave in
whom he has observed a brave spirit residing. It is plain that one who
is endowed with speed is swift-footed. So also music makes men musical,
the healing art physicians, rhetoric public speakers. For each of these
has naturally its own proper working; there is no confusion with the
effects of contrary things--nay, even of itself it rejects what is
incompatible. And yet wealth cannot extinguish insatiable greed, nor has
power ever made him master of himself whom vicious lusts kept bound in
indissoluble fetters; dignity conferred on the wicked not only fails to
make them worthy, but contrarily reveals and displays their
unworthiness. Why does it so happen? Because ye take pleasure in calling
by false names things whose nature is quite incongruous thereto--by
names which are easily proved false by the very effects of the things
themselves; even so it is; these riches, that power, this dignity, are
none of them rightly so called. Finally, we may draw the same conclusion
concerning the whole sphere of Fortune, within which there is plainly
nothing to be truly desired, nothing of intrinsic excellence; for she
neither always joins herself to the good, nor does she make good men of
those to whom she is united.'



SONG VI. NERO'S INFAMY.


    We know what mischief dire he wrought--
      Rome fired, the Fathers slain--
    Whose hand with brother's slaughter wet
      A mother's blood did stain.

    No pitying tear his cheek bedewed,
      As on the corse he gazed;
    That mother's beauty, once so fair,
      A critic's voice appraised.

    Yet far and wide, from East to West,
      His sway the nations own;
    And scorching South and icy North
      Obey his will alone.

    Did, then, high power a curb impose
      On Nero's phrenzied will?
    Ah, woe when to the evil heart
      Is joined the sword to kill!



VII.


Then said I: 'Thou knowest thyself that ambition for worldly success
hath but little swayed me. Yet I have desired opportunity for action,
lest virtue, in default of exercise, should languish away.'

Then she: 'This is that "last infirmity" which is able to allure minds
which, though of noble quality, have not yet been moulded to any
exquisite refinement by the perfecting of the virtues--I mean, the love
of glory--and fame for high services rendered to the commonweal. And yet
consider with me how poor and unsubstantial a thing this glory is! The
whole of this earth's globe, as thou hast learnt from the demonstration
of astronomy, compared with the expanse of heaven, is found no bigger
than a point; that is to say, if measured by the vastness of heaven's
sphere, it is held to occupy absolutely no space at all. Now, of this so
insignificant portion of the universe, it is about a fourth part, as
Ptolemy's proofs have taught us, which is inhabited by living creatures
known to us. If from this fourth part you take away in thought all that
is usurped by seas and marshes, or lies a vast waste of waterless
desert, barely is an exceeding narrow area left for human habitation.
You, then, who are shut in and prisoned in this merest fraction of a
point's space, do ye take thought for the blazoning of your fame, for
the spreading abroad of your renown? Why, what amplitude or magnificence
has glory when confined to such narrow and petty limits?

'Besides, the straitened bounds of this scant dwelling-place are
inhabited by many nations differing widely in speech, in usages, in mode
of life; to many of these, from the difficulty of travel, from
diversities of speech, from want of commercial intercourse, the fame not
only of individual men, but even of cities, is unable to reach. Why, in
Cicero's days, as he himself somewhere points out, the fame of the Roman
Republic had not yet crossed the Caucasus, and yet by that time her
name had grown formidable to the Parthians and other nations of those
parts. Seest thou, then, how narrow, how confined, is the glory ye take
pains to spread abroad and extend! Can the fame of a single Roman
penetrate where the glory of the Roman name fails to pass? Moreover, the
customs and institutions of different races agree not together, so that
what is deemed praise worthy in one country is thought punishable in
another. Wherefore, if any love the applause of fame, it shall not
profit him to publish his name among many peoples. Then, each must be
content to have the range of his glory limited to his own people; the
splendid immortality of fame must be confined within the bounds of a
single race.

'Once more, how many of high renown in their own times have been lost in
oblivion for want of a record! Indeed, of what avail are written records
even, which, with their authors, are overtaken by the dimness of age
after a somewhat longer time? But ye, when ye think on future fame,
fancy it an immortality that ye are begetting for yourselves. Why, if
thou scannest the infinite spaces of eternity, what room hast thou left
for rejoicing in the durability of thy name? Verily, if a single
moment's space be compared with ten thousand years, it has a certain
relative duration, however little, since each period is definite. But
this same number of years--ay, and a number many times as great--cannot
even be compared with endless duration; for, indeed, finite periods may
in a sort be compared one with another, but a finite and an infinite
never. So it comes to pass that fame, though it extend to ever so wide a
space of years, if it be compared to never-lessening eternity, seems not
short-lived merely, but altogether nothing. But as for you, ye know not
how to act aright, unless it be to court the popular breeze, and win the
empty applause of the multitude--nay, ye abandon the superlative worth
of conscience and virtue, and ask a recompense from the poor words of
others. Let me tell thee how wittily one did mock the shallowness of
this sort of arrogance. A certain man assailed one who had put on the
name of philosopher as a cloak to pride and vain-glory, not for the
practice of real virtue, and added: "Now shall I know if thou art a
philosopher if thou bearest reproaches calmly and patiently." The other
for awhile affected to be patient, and, having endured to be abused,
cried out derisively: "_Now_, do you see that I am a philosopher?" The
other, with biting sarcasm, retorted: "I should have hadst thou held thy
peace." Moreover, what concern have choice spirits--for it is of such
men we speak, men who seek glory by virtue--what concern, I say, have
these with fame after the dissolution of the body in death's last hour?
For if men die wholly--which our reasonings forbid us to believe--there
is no such thing as glory at all, since he to whom the glory is said to
belong is altogether non-existent. But if the mind, conscious of its own
rectitude, is released from its earthly prison, and seeks heaven in free
flight, doth it not despise all earthly things when it rejoices in its
deliverance from earthly bonds, and enters upon the joys of heaven?'



SONG VII. GLORY MAY NOT LAST.


    Oh, let him, who pants for glory's guerdon,
      Deeming glory all in all,
    Look and see how wide the heaven expandeth,
      Earth's enclosing bounds how small!

    Shame it is, if your proud-swelling glory
      May not fill this narrow room!
    Why, then, strive so vainly, oh, ye proud ones!
      To escape your mortal doom?

    Though your name, to distant regions bruited,
      O'er the earth be widely spread,
    Though full many a lofty-sounding title
      On your house its lustre shed,

    Death at all this pomp and glory spurneth
      When his hour draweth nigh,
    Shrouds alike th' exalted and the humble,
      Levels lowest and most high.

    Where are now the bones of stanch Fabricius?
      Brutus, Cato--where are they?
    Lingering fame, with a few graven letters,
      Doth their empty name display.

    But to know the great dead is not given
      From a gilded name alone;
    Nay, ye all alike must lie forgotten,
      'Tis not _you_ that fame makes known.

    Fondly do ye deem life's little hour
      Lengthened by fame's mortal breath;
    There but waits you--when this, too, is taken--
      At the last a second death.



VIII.


'But that thou mayst not think that I wage implacable warfare against
Fortune, I own there is a time when the deceitful goddess serves men
well--I mean when she reveals herself, uncovers her face, and confesses
her true character. Perhaps thou dost not yet grasp my meaning. Strange
is the thing I am trying to express, and for this cause I can scarce
find words to make clear my thought. For truly I believe that Ill
Fortune is of more use to men than Good Fortune. For Good Fortune, when
she wears the guise of happiness, and most seems to caress, is always
lying; Ill Fortune is always truthful, since, in changing, she shows her
inconstancy. The one deceives, the other teaches; the one enchains the
minds of those who enjoy her favour by the semblance of delusive good,
the other delivers them by the knowledge of the frail nature of
happiness. Accordingly, thou mayst see the one fickle, shifting as the
breeze, and ever self-deceived; the other sober-minded, alert, and wary,
by reason of the very discipline of adversity. Finally, Good Fortune, by
her allurements, draws men far from the true good; Ill Fortune ofttimes
draws men back to true good with grappling-irons. Again, should it be
esteemed a trifling boon, thinkest thou, that this cruel, this odious
Fortune hath discovered to thee the hearts of thy faithful friends--that
other hid from thee alike the faces of the true friends and of the
false, but in departing she hath taken away _her_ friends, and left thee
_thine_? What price wouldst thou not have given for this service in the
fulness of thy prosperity when thou seemedst to thyself fortunate?
Cease, then, to seek the wealth thou hast lost, since in true friends
thou hast found the most precious of all riches.'



SONG VIII. LOVE IS LORD OF ALL.


    Why are Nature's changes bound
    To a fixed and ordered round?
    What to leagued peace hath bent
    Every warring element?
    Wherefore doth the rosy morn
    Rise on Phoebus' car upborne?
    Why should Phoebe rule the night,
    Led by Hesper's guiding light?
    What the power that doth restrain
    In his place the restless main,
    That within fixed bounds he keeps,
    Nor o'er earth in deluge sweeps?
    Love it is that holds the chains,
    Love o'er sea and earth that reigns;
    Love--whom else but sovereign Love?--
    Love, high lord in heaven above!
    Yet should he his care remit,
    All that now so close is knit
    In sweet love and holy peace,
    Would no more from conflict cease,
    But with strife's rude shock and jar
    All the world's fair fabric mar.

    Tribes and nations Love unites
    By just treaty's sacred rites;
    Wedlock's bonds he sanctifies
    By affection's softest ties.
    Love appointeth, as is due,
    Faithful laws to comrades true--
    Love, all-sovereign Love!--oh, then,
    Ye are blest, ye sons of men,
    If the love that rules the sky
    In your hearts is throned on high!



</CHAPTER>

BOOK III.

TRUE HAPPINESS AND FALSE.


     SUMMARY

     CH. I. Boethius beseeches Philosophy to continue. She promises to
     lead him to true happiness.--CH. II. Happiness is the one end which
     all created beings seek. They aim variously at (_a_) wealth, or
     (_b_) rank, or (_c_) sovereignty, or (_d_) glory, or (_e_)
     pleasure, because they think thereby to attain either (_a_)
     contentment, (_b_) reverence, (_c_) power, (_d_) renown, or (_e_)
     gladness of heart, in one or other of which they severally imagine
     happiness to consist.--CH. III. Philosophy proceeds to consider
     whether happiness can really be secured in any of these ways, (_a_)
     So far from bringing contentment, riches only add to men's
     wants.--CH. IV. (_b_) High position cannot of itself win respect.
     Titles command no reverence in distant and barbarous lands. They
     even fall into contempt through lapse of time.--CH. V. (_c_)
     Sovereignty cannot even bestow safety. History tells of the
     downfall of kings and their ministers. Tyrants go in fear of their
     lives. --CH. VI. (_d_) Fame conferred on the unworthy is but
     disgrace. The splendour of noble birth is not a man's own, but his
     ancestors'.--CH. VII. (_e_) Pleasure begins in the restlessness of
     desire, and ends in repentance. Even the pure pleasures of home may
     turn to gall and bitterness.--CH. VIII. All fail, then, to give
     what they promise. There is, moreover, some accompanying evil
     involved in each of these aims. Beauty and bodily strength are
     likewise of little worth. In strength man is surpassed by the
     brutes; beauty is but outward show.--CH. IX. The source of men's
     error in following these phantoms of good is that _they break up
     and separate that which is in its nature one and indivisible_.
     Contentment, power, reverence, renown, and joy are essentially
     bound up one with the other, and, if they are to be attained at
     all, must be attained _together_. True happiness, if it can be
     found, will include them all. But it cannot be found among the
     perishable things hitherto considered.--CH. X. Such a happiness
     necessarily exists. Its seat is in God. Nay, God is very happiness,
     and in a manner, therefore, the happy man partakes also of the
     Divine nature. All other ends are relative to this good, since they
     are all pursued only for the sake of good; it is _good_ which is
     the sole ultimate end. And since the sole end is also happiness, it
     is plain that this good and happiness are in essence the same.--CH.
     XI. Unity is another aspect of goodness. Now, all things subsist so
     long only as they preserve the unity of their being; when they lose
     this unity, they perish. But the bent of nature forces all things
     (plants and inanimate things, as well as animals) to strive to
     continue in life. Therefore, all things desire unity, for unity is
     essential to life. But unity and goodness were shown to be the
     same. Therefore, good is proved to be the end towards which the
     whole universe tends.[E]--CH. XII. Boethius acknowledges that he is
     but recollecting truths he once knew. Philosophy goes on to show
     that it is goodness also by which the whole world is governed.[F]
     Boethius professes compunction for his former folly. But the
     paradox of evil is introduced, and he is once more perplexed.


FOOTNOTES:

[E] This solves the second of the points left in doubt at the end of bk.
i., ch. vi.

[F] This solves the third. No distinct account is given of the first,
but an answer may be gathered from the general argument of bks. ii.,
iii., and iv.



Book II
At the beginning of Book II, Lady Philosophy has grown silent. She has become quiet so that Boethius, in his weakened spiritual state, entreats her to speak. She says that she has fully diagnosed the cause and nature of his condition, and will prepare the "persuasive powers of sweet-tongued rhetoric," a power often abused by those who do not properly understand Philosophy, to gently heal him of his illness. Again, she reiterates that Boethius is pining away for his former good fortune, and the loss of which has corrupted his mind. She says that Boethius has been seduced by Fortune , and that in her many guises she has lured other people to their undoing, too. Again, Philosophy describes the capricious nature of Fortune, pointing out how the workings of Fortune are not to be considered tragic when they cause reversals for her former beneficiaries. Fortune's "gifts" are really loans, Philosophy reminds Boethius, and to return something that was only lent to you is not a loss and not something about which to grieve. Philosophy also implies that, while Boethius enjoyed Fortune's favors, he must have known that her gifts were not very important anyway. Boethius is reminded not only that he came into this world with none of Fortune's gifts, and he should never have become so attached to any of them that he could not lose them without grief. While Boethius acknowledges the logic of Philosophy's argument, he is not yet in a fit state to receive comfort from it. Here Philosophy reminds Boethius, somewhat to his pain so she does not dwell on it, that he was in this earthly life the luckiest of men. Though orphaned, he was adopted into the home of a very aristocratic and well-respected man, and he married into that same family. He has been blessed not only with a worthy and modest wife, but also two good sons. And he had the privilege of seeing those sons raised to the office of consul together. Boethius then complains that the worst part of this is the memory of his past good fortune. "In all adversity of fortune, the most wretched kind is once to have been happy." Philosophy counters that the most precious gift from Fortune, Boethius's family, still exists unharmed. Compared to many, Fortune says, Boethius is still a very fortunate man. A debate ensues on the way happiness can be attained by a human being, for, it seems, even if a person has all the gifts of fortune, there is still anxiety and disquiet in his or her heart. Philosophy says that human happiness is impossible to achieve in earthly life. Happiness is not found in the temporal gifts of Fortune - not even in those most precious gifts of family. The discussion continues onto the nature of "good" in the things that the world considers "good fortune," which are wealth, material possessions, power, and honor. Each of these things is said by Philosophy to be incapable of bestowing true happiness. Wealth is only of value when being transferred, and such has no value in itself. In addition, any acquisition of wealth is the taking away of wealth from someone else. The power of wealth is not something that is your own, but rather a function of that wealth, so then how can it make you happy? Honor and power can be bestowed upon you by someone who is not a fair judge of either, so these are not the path to happiness either. The beauty of Nature, too, is incapable of giving true happiness because we cannot take credit for Nature. It is entirely the construction of God, and therefore we can only admire it but cannot claim it for our own. If one desires fancy clothing, or a long line of servants, the good of either cannot be truly owned by the possessor, so they are not the path to happiness either. "From all this it is obvious that not one of those things which you count among your blessings is in fact any blessing of yours at all." Philosophy says. The only things which a person may truly possess are the blessings of his or her own intellectual inquiry and soul. Since these are internal blessings, it is argued, they can never be taken away, and are wholly owned by the thinker. God, Philosophy says, made human beings to rule the Earth, but not to attempt to adorn themselves with inferior things. God has given humankind an intellect by which to inquire into philosophical things, not to concern themselves with goods which can only be inferior to the worth of their own minds. Add to this that the human soul is immortal, and cannot and never will be satisfied by a temporal happiness from earthly things, which would only last until the death of the body. Boethius counters that he never wanted any of the temporal blessings for his own sake. He is not an ambitious man, but only entered public life out of a sense of duty. But Lady Philosophy reminds Boethius that he did enjoy his honors, and, while they were well-deserved, it is important that everyone remembers that the gifts of Fortune are inconstant and can be easily taken away. After death, the soul will look back on what was so important in life and consider it to be insignificant. In this life, it is probably better for the soul to have bad fortune, for that does not enslave the soul as much as good fortune does. Philosophy relents slightly from her strict censure of Fortune's gifts near the end of Book II, when she says that bad fortune gives another great gift; the knowledge of one's true friends, the ones who truly love you. This wisdom, she says, could not be bought for any price while one had good fortune. She ends the book with a hymn about how love binds the earth together.
The beginning of Book II contains a subtle hint to the reader that Boethius was a spiritual and philosophical man before his honors and possessions were taken away by imprisonment.  When Philosophy says that Boethius, in the favors of Fortune, had "nothing much of value" it is clear that Boethius has always had, or at least affected to have, a disdain for worldly things.  A man who was born into a patrician family, with a famous name and extraordinary powers of intellect, who never wanted for money, and experienced royal favor and advancement for much of his life may well have had disdain for worldly possessions, honors, and achievements.  This passage seems a little naA-ve unless considered within the context of Christianity.  If Boethius were still a pagan Roman, the gifts of the goddess Fortuna would have been things to pray for, and, if received, things for which he would have given praise to the gods.  But the teachings of Catholic Christianity were such that none of the gifts of Fortune  were to be valued as much as the love of God and spiritual enlightenment.  Boethius is espousing a wholly Christian position here, couched in the language of philosophy. The psychological progression of Boethius here is plain to see.  He slowly allows his emotions to quieten, letting himself rest while he turns his thoughts back to the logic of Philosophy's argument.  His sorrow is still acute and not assuaged, but he thinks he has possibly found the way to convince himself that his lot is not so bad.  Boethius, throughout his life, was very interested in logic, and wrote several books on the subject.  He believed wholeheartedly in its powers, and The Consolation of Philosophy can be viewed as a logical justification for much of Christian doctrine. The enshrinement of Symmachus, Boethius's father-in-law, and Boethius's wife, Rusticiana, as paragons of moral purity seem to give comfort to Boethius.  Again, it is argued, however, that true happiness cannot be found in the temporal gifts of Fortune, not even in the love of one's family.  While this idea is not necessarily one that would be agreed upon by modern psychology, it is essential to Christian belief.  It is also indicative of the times in which Boethius lived.  Not only could family  be taken off quickly by disease or accident, but the uncertain political climate of Rome governed by the barbarian emperors also meant that the lives of one's family and friends were by no means assured.  Placing total faith in and hanging one's happiness on one's loved ones was an easy way, Philosophy argues, to become quickly unhappy. The middle and end of Book II is one of Boethius's most powerful passages.  He begins with his complaint that to have been happy and then be disgraced is more sorrowful than having never been happy.  Boethius, though perhaps feeling this emotion sharply in his miserable imprisonment, surely knows the fallacy of this argument before he begins it.  Philosophy sharply reminds him that one of the most precious gifts of Fortune, his family, is still intact, and therefore he should be happier than many men.  Philosophy explains that he has lost nothing that he ever truly had, and she then enlightens Boethius on the "good" in earthly good things that was never truly good, because it was never truly possessed.  Philosophy argues that even pleasures that seem obvious, such as the pleasure of having many servants to do our hard work, are not necessarily "good" - after all, when our servants do wrong we are responsible, but when they do right we cannot claim credit. This points to Philosophy's essential argument: a person cannot claim credit for the "good" he or she experiences in earthly life.  This "good" depends on Fortune and not on human effort.  Only attainment of philosophical wisdom in the mind can truly be called one's own. This argument may or may not convince many readers, but it is sound in many respects.  It explains, especially in regard to wealth, the momentary satisfaction but enduring emptiness many people feel upon attaining certain goals of wealth or material possessions.  Near the end of Book II Philosophy explains that most people mistake the "good" of inferior things  for the true good: the good eternal things of the soul.  It is a standard religious tenet of more than one faith, but the way Boethius couches it in terms of ownership is compelling. He particularly shines in his explanation of how most people attempt to adorn themselves with exterior, inferior "goods"  while they neglect the greatest and only real good that they possess: their minds made in the image of their Creator.  When human beings recognize their own nature as being Godlike, rather than earthly, that is when they "tower above the rest of creation."  All other goods, separate from the mind and the soul, are merely "decoration" that denigrates what it is decorating, because it does not belong to it.  Some readers may find the argument about ownership to be too callous, and perhaps the rejection of Nature as a source of happiness is skewed, but the overall construction of the chapter is a convincing argument for spirituality. Some of this argument is based on Neo-Platonist principles of substance and belonging, which don't directly affect the argument but inform some of Boethius' language.  Boethius tosses out phrases such as "If every good is agreed to be more valuable than whatever it belongs to" as if the reader, schooled in philosophy, would not dispute these statements or require explanation.  Nevertheless, Book II is intense, convincing, and contains eight beautiful poems which explicate the text.